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This thesis analyzes the effect of high levels of criminal violence on military 
missions and civil–military relations. Specifically, it examines how the criminal violence 
in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras changed the militaries and subsequently altered 
the civil–military relations in each country. In order to determine the change, each 
country is evaluated in terms of military missions immediately after transitioning to a 
civilian democracy and then again in present day. Similarly, each country is then 
evaluated for the state of civil–military relations at the end of military authoritarianism, 
and then again in present day. The results of the research show that the militaries have 
changed in three distinct ways: 1) the overall missions have shifted from traditional to 
internal, 2) the equipment used and procured is best suited for internal missions, and 3) 
the doctrine and training of the militaries supports an internal role. The civil–military 
relations research shows that there is an imbalance as a result of the criminal violence. 
The violence minimized the time for civilians to fully establish defense knowledge and 
civilian-controlled institutions, such as the Ministry of Defense, resulting in a heavily 
involved and politicized military.       
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At approximately 7:00 p.m. on Christmas Eve 2004, people were finishing their 
last-minute Christmas shopping and returning home on a city bus in San Pedro Sula, 
Honduras, when a truck containing about six men cut-off the bus driver and proceeded to 
open fire on the 70 passengers.1 The passengers and the bus were chosen at random by 
the shooters, who left a note on the bus that claimed the attack was a result of the 
Honduran government’s harsh crackdown on crime and violence.2 This is just one 
example of the rampant crime and violence that takes place daily in the Northern Triangle 
countries of Central America. The criminal element permeates all social and political 
institutions in this region, including the military as an institution and its relation to 
civilian leadership. This leads to two research questions. First, how does the constant 
presence of criminal violence in a country change its military? Second, what impact do 
these changes have on the civil–military relations? To answer these questions, I will 
focus on the countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, which all exhibit 
heightened levels of violence and organized crime, post-civil war. 
This chapter will highlight the current state of the literature on the two pertinent 
questions, followed by the main arguments that are addressed in the analysis. Next, this 
chapter will discuss the methods employed in this research and the logic behind the 
selection of the cases used. Finally, this chapter will highlight the overall organization of 
the thesis. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following literature review will address the current research pertaining to the 
two main research questions.  First, I will cover the criminal violence and the role of the 
military.  Specifically, this literature will cover three main arguments about the military’s 
role to internal security: The military will intervene regardless of their mission, the 
                                                 
1Ginger Thompson, “Gunmen Kill 28 on Bus in Honduras; Street Gangs Blamed,” New York Times, 




military can be used successfully as a police force, and the military should not be 
employed in an internal security role. Second, I will provide literature on the criminal 
violence and civil–military relations, and the two main arguments addressed in this 
research. The first argument is that there exists a lack of incentives for civilians in Latin 
America to gain control over defense matters, and the second is that civilians must 
increase defense knowledge and be cognizant of what they do not know.  
1. Criminal Violence and the Role of the Military 
Criminal Violence and the Role of the Military. To answer the question on the 
impact of criminal violence on the military, I look at the civil–military relations area of 
studies that look at militaries with police missions. Despite the popularity using the 
military to address criminal threats, there are many different viewpoints on the use of the 
military to combat internal security problems. There are three schools of thought 
addressing this issue. The first argues that the military will intervene in public security, 
regardless of their mission, and hence the impact of violence on the military itself is non-
existent: the military remains military. In this vein, other factors matter more for shaping 
military behavior. The second viewpoint is that militaries can be used successfully to 
counter internal violence and thus become like police with no negative impact. Finally, 
the last school of thought views the use of the military in internal missions as an 
inappropriate use of the military, compelling the military to engage in human rights 
abuses and corruption. Each will be discussed below. 
a. The Military Is as the Military Does 
The first group acknowledges that the military may intervene in politics or 
situations of concern to them, regardless of their mission. In this regard, it is important to 
understand the ideology of the militaries in Latin America. The militaries of the world 
have proven repeatedly that they will intervene when, and if, they must. Samuel Finer 
describes the reason for intervention as the militaries three advantages over civilian 
organizations: “a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic 
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status, and a monopoly of arms.”3 With this in mind, it is easier to grasp the mindset of 
Latin American militaries and their defense of the homeland. According to Brian 
Loveman, “Defending la patria (the nation, or fatherland) against internal and external 
threats is the historical mission claimed by Latin American armed forces.”4 In other 
words, the militaries in Latin America will do what they must in order to defend 
everything they love and hold dear. As threats change shape and bring on new meaning in 
the twenty-first century, the militaries in Latin America will continue to uphold their 
historical tradition of guarding and protecting.5 These groups of authors would likely 
argue that the constant presence of violence in a region would not change the role of the 
military at all. According to these viewpoints, the military, historically, has been involved 
in internal security matters, as it deems necessary. 
b. Military as Police Force 
The second group of viewpoints believes that the military can be used 
successfully to counter internal violence. Within these views, the success of use and level 
of involvement vary. The original theory that many rely on today is the idea that the 
military can be turned into a constabulary force, capable of dealing with police work. 
According to Morris Janowitz, “the military establishment becomes a constabulary force 
when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and 
seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a 
protective military posture.”6 According to this concept, there is no distinction between 
wartime and peacetime, and therefore, it relates to a policing mentality.7 In a related 
study, Brian Reed and David Segal examined the military’s participation in 
                                                 
3Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction, 2002), 6. 
4Brian Loveman, For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America, (Wilmington, DE: 
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), xi.  
5Ibid., 279.  
6Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, (New York: The Free 
Press, 1960), 418.  
7Ibid., 419.  
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“nontraditional operations” and what effects it might have.8 This study determined that 
the military, for the most part, accepted the nontraditional missions and believed these 
missions fell into the purview of the military.9 Similarly, Derek Lutterbeck argues that 
the post-Cold War security challenges blur the lines between internal and external threats, 
and, therefore, require a convergence of police and military responsibilities in the form of 
gendarmeries or paramilitary forces.10 The last viewpoint within the realm of using the 
military to combat internal security threats acknowledges the convergence of the 
functions of the police and the military. In this idea, the belief is that the use of the 
military is possible; however, there would be “a substantial alteration in the 
organizational cultures of both professions, as each profession adjusts to new 
orientations, new norms, and new values surrounding its core purpose.”11 These groups 
of viewpoints and authors would agree that, in the presence of constant criminal violence, 
the military is forced to take on a police-like structure and role. The authors would 
contend that the military, or a military style force, would be a viable option to counter 
excessive domestic violence.  
c. The Dark Side of Military in Public Security 
The third group of viewpoints, which are also very important to consider, view 
the use of the military in internal missions as an inappropriate use of the military. The 
arguments that support this view the roles of the military and police as too different. One 
argument states that “democratic policing especially is undermined by military 
involvement,” and continues to state that militaries “recognized long ago that police 
duties were antithetical to their war-fighting mission.”12 Another view expresses the 
                                                 
8Brian J. Reed and David R. Segal, “The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldiers’ Peacekeeping 
Attitudes, Morale, and Retention,” Armed Forces & Society 27, no. 1 (2000): 57.  
9Ibid., 74.  
10Derek Lutterbeck, “Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of 
Gendarmeries,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 39, no. 
1 (2004): 45-46.  
11Donald J. Campbell and Kathleen M. Campbell, “Soldiers as Police Officers/Police Officers as 
Soldiers: Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States,” Armed Forces & Society 36, no. 2 (2010): 
346.  
12David H. Bayley, Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 2001), 38-39.  
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concern for the constabularization of the military to function as a police. According to 
Doron Zimmermann, if the police are not equipped or able to handle the security threat, 
and the military is trained to use maximum force, then a third option—a paramilitary as a 
separate entity—is the best choice.13 According to this argument, changing the military’s 
role to a policing force will inadvertently change the very structure of the military from 
its main job of using maximum force to win wars.14 Lastly, another argument that fits in 
this realm of thought is that the reliance on the military for internal policing is bad for 
both the military and the public it is trying to protect.15 The argument is that “no one 
should suffer the illusion that military forces could ever execute the laws with the same 
sensitivity to civil liberties as regular police forces. To do so is at odds with the central 
imperatives of military service. Moreover, a successful policization of the armed forces 
may well render it incapable of defeating authentic external military threats.”16 These 
authors would argue that the presence of constant criminal violence should not change 
the function of the military from an external mission oriented, maximum use of force 
organization to an internal security force. To do so would leave a weakened military and 
an increase in civil–military tensions.   
The three differing viewpoints on the use of the military in internal security 
matters is a great starting point for further research. The main problem with the current 
literature is the lack of a relation to criminal violence. The literature focuses a great deal 
on the actual use or non-use of the military but fails to tie it into a specific reason for use. 
The research in this thesis will attempt to make the correlation or causal relationship 
between the constant criminal violence present in a region, and the deployment of 
military forces for internal security missions. 
                                                 
13Doron Zimmermann, “Between Minimum Force and Maximum Violence: Combating Political 
Violence Movements with Third-Force Options,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 4, no. 1 (2005): 44.  
14Ibid., 54.  
15Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “The Police-ization of the Military,” Journal of Political and Military 
Sociology 27 (1999): 217.  
16Ibid., 227.  
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2. Criminal Violence and Civil–Military Relations 
In answering the questions about the impact of criminal violence on civil–military 
relations, I naturally look towards the area of work that concentrates on civilian control. 
Specifically, what is required for civilian control, and what are the arguments about 
civilian control in the Latin America region? The literature has an array of different 
definitions for civilian control, but this review will focus in on the foundational ideas of 
civilian control, and then review two distinct arguments about the success or failure of 
civilian control in Latin America. 
In the book, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations, Samuel Huntington introduces the idea of “objective civilian control.”17 This 
type of control focuses on the professionalization of the military. For Huntington, civilian 
control “is that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which 
is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the 
members of the officer corps.”18 Another key component to Huntington’s definition of 
civilian control is the requirement of the civilians to possess enough knowledge to create 
and advise senior civilians on defense policies.19 Similarly, Felipe Agüero argues that 
civilians should be well versed in defense so as to be able to formulate and implement 
defense policy, and outline defense organization and goals without the explicit assistance 
or interference of the military.20 J. Samuel Fitch contends that in a civilian controlled 
relationship the civilians must be able to “define the threats against which the country 
must be protected and the missions to be assigned to the armed forces,” as well as be able 
to solve defense budget problems in a situation with limited resources, implying a vast 
knowledge of national security and defense.21  
                                                 
17Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 83. 
18Ibid.  
19Ibid., 434, 441, 450.  
20Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 19-20.  
21J. Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998), 37.  
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a. Lack of Incentive for Civilians  
The first key argument in the literature about the civil-military relations in Latin 
America is that the “political leaders have had considerable success at subordinating their 
militaries to civilian rule, but they have done so without a fundamental knowledge of or 
interest in defense affairs.”22 The argument that David Pion-Berlin makes is that 
militaries in Latin American countries do not have a real external threat of war from 
outside their own borders, and therefore, there is no need or incentive for civilians “to 
worry about investing the necessary time to understanding defense, strategy, tactics, 
preparation, budgeting, deployment, doctrine, or training.”23 Pion-Berlin argues that the 
militaries in Latin America need political leadership, not defense leadership, which he 
admits is counter to the widely accepted terms and definitions of civilian control over the 
military in the literature.24 According to this argument, constant criminal violence would 
not have a significant effect on the status of civil–military relations, or civilian control of 
the military, regardless of the role of the military in combating the violence. Due to the 
lack of knowledge, and the lack of a requirement to increase knowledge on defense, the 
constant criminal violence would not play a role in the status of civil–military relations.  
b. Defense Knowledge Is a Must  
In response to the argument presented by Pion-Berlin, Thomas Bruneau and 
Richard Goetze presented another argument, which acknowledges the differences in 
Latin American civil–military relations compared to the majority of the civil–military 
relations, but also counters Pion-Berlin’s theory of minimal defense knowledge. Bruneau 
and Goetze argue that “civilians must know enough to be able to ensure that the armed 
forces are doing what they are required to do, not only in terms of submitting to civilian 
control but also in successfully fulfilling the current very wide spectrum of roles and 
                                                 
22David S. Pion-Berlin, “Political Management of the Military in Latin America,” Military Review 85 




missions assigned to security forces in Latin America.”25 This argument acknowledges 
that civilians will not have as much of an in-depth understanding or expertise on defense 
or national security, but contends that they must have some amount of understanding, and 
they must also be cognoscente of what they do not know.26 According to this viewpoint, 
the presence of constant criminal violence would likely play a significant role on the 
status of the civil–military relations in a country. Depending on the change in the 
military’s role, the requirement for an increase in defense knowledge may increase, or 
shift to a domestic security, paramilitary knowledge. If this shift does occur, in order to 
maintain the civilian control of the military, the civilians would need to focus on the 
military’s new roles and functions.    
B. ARGUMENT  
When considering the first main question in this thesis, how does criminal 
violence change militaries, the cases studied reveal that in Central America specifically, 
the military is changed in three distinct ways. First, the overall mission of the military is 
changed from one of a traditional, external threat force to one that focuses internally. 
Second, the equipment used and procured by the military begins to shift to a counter-
crime focus, resulting in an ill-equipped military in terms of its ability to combat external 
threats and defend sovereignty from outside aggressors. Lastly, the doctrine and training 
are modified to be better suited to combat the internal security threat, leaving the 
traditional and counter-insurgency roles as an afterthought. 
The changes that can be seen in the military are counter to the typical viewpoint 
of a military in a consolidated democracy and highlights the problems that can arise in 
the presence of criminal violence. The first problem is that the new military roles create a 
perception that the police forces—the democratic institution that should be combating 
crime within a country—are unable to do their job. This may very well be the case. The 
next problem is that it creates a military force that is lacking in its ability to combat 
                                                 
25Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard B. Goetze, “Civilian-Military Relations in Latin America,” Military 
Review 88 (September-October 2006): 67.  
26Ibid.  
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external aggressors, depending on the enemy, if the need ever arises. This is due to 
several factors, such as being ill equipped to fight and having doctrine and training that 
lends itself to internal police-type missions rather than external military missions.   
In addressing the second question, how does the violence affect the civil–military 
relations, the case studies reveal that due to the rapid appearance of criminal violence 
following the civil war settlement, civilian elites did not have the time or incentive to 
increase defense and public security knowledge, and therefore the Ministry of Defense 
has been handed over to military control, ultimately resulting in an imbalance in civil–
military relations where the military has become more politically powerful. Despite 
having a framework in place immediately after the transitions to civilian power, each 
country was unable to capitalize on the plans because of the need to fight and try to solve 
the problem of the extreme violence in the countries. 
The imbalanced civil–military relations in each of these countries are a step in the 
wrong direction for young democracies. At a time when civilian control needs to be the 
strongest, it appears that the military is once again running itself with more political 
power than they should have. Since the transition, the progression of control within the 
military has continued to increase, without any solution to the violence coming to the 
forefront. 
C. METHODS AND CASE SELECTION LOGIC 
The research conducted in this thesis will not be the typical theory testing 
research. Instead, it will focus more on theory building. Specifically, this thesis will be 
conducting a plausibility probe. According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, 
plausibility probes are “preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and hypotheses 
to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted.”27 In other 
words, will the theories or arguments developed as a result of this research be strong 
enough to merit further studies? The goal of this research is to provide initial theories 
strong enough to answer the relatively unanswered question of how criminal violence 
                                                 
27Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 75. 
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affects militaries and civil–military relations, which can then be expanded upon with 
further research and case studies.   
The independent variable throughout the research for this thesis will be the 
constant presence of high levels of criminal violence. The violence will be measured in 
terms of the homicide rate, the presence of maras, and the presence of transnational 
criminal organizations (TCO) such as drug traffickers and cartels. The dependent 
variables that will be examined are the roles of the military as a result of the criminal 
violence, and the effect on civil–military relations. The change in the roles of the military 
will be examined by researching the military’s roles and missions after the initial 
transition to democracy in each country, and then by researching the current roles and 
missions the military fulfills. The civil–military relations variable will be studied by 
researching the structure of the defense ministry in each country to determine if there 
have been any significant changes from the democratic transition and the present day.  
The countries that will be studied are all within the Northern Triangle region of 
Central America, where there is an increased level of criminal violence from drug 
traffickers, maras, and TCOs. Specifically, the countries that will be studied are El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. All three of these countries exhibit excessive levels 
of violence. This violence is associated with high levels of homicide, corruption, and 
human rights violations. Despite efforts by the local governments, and assistance from 
outside entities, the violence remains a major concern for the government and citizens 
that reside in the region. Nicaragua, despite being located adjacent to the Northern 
Triangle, lacks the criminal violence necessary to be included as a case study. The 
timeframe that will be evaluated is post-civil war (for El Salvador and Guatemala), and 
post-transition to democracy (for Honduras) to present day. It is important to evaluate 
these countries during this timeframe because all three of these countries transitioned 
from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes. 
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D. ORGANIZATION PLAN FOR THE THESIS 
This thesis will be organized into three distinct chapters. The second chapter will 
discuss the foundation of violence in the region and the current violence that the countries 
are facing. The third chapter will address the question: How does the criminal violence 
affect the militaries? The fourth chapter will address the question, how does the criminal 
violence affect the civil–military relations? Within each of these chapters, the cases being 
utilized will be separated into separate sections, with analysis following. The fifth and 
final chapter will be a conclusion with a summary of the findings from the research, 
along with recommendations for the region being studied, as well as recommendations 
for further research to continue to expand the knowledge gained from this project.  
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II. A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE 
To understand the situation that is taking place in Latin America necessitates a 
review of the legacy of violence in the region, which has existed since the discovery of 
Latin America. Many scholars believe this violence is proof that Latin American nations 
are examples of failed democracies; however, there are also scholars that have a better 
understanding of the violence and argue that the violence is an important foundation for 
democracy in the region.28 These authors argue, “Instead of viewing violence as 
indicative of democratic failure, we can, from a violently plural perspective, understand 
violence as critical to the foundation of Latin American democracies, the maintenance of 
democratic states, and the political behavior of democratic citizens.”29 These violent 
democracies are the legacy of a long and bloody past.  
The following will provide a very brief historical explanation for why violence 
has thrived and continues to thrive in all of Latin America today. Specifically, the 
Spanish Reconquista (reconquest), which occurred prior to the discovery of Latin 
America, established a mentality of violence in the region as the Spanish began to 
colonize the region. The nature of the colonialism itself also lends to the violence that can 
be seen today, as it was extractive in nature and established the authoritarian style of 
government, which dominated the region for decades to follow. Lastly, the independence 
era set the grounds for violent battles and opened the door to a power vacuum that 
ultimately led to the period of caudillismo—strongman leadership after the wars of 
independence—and more violence.  
A. SPANISH RECONQUISTA 
The Spanish Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula can arguably be labeled as the 
single most important event in history that ultimately led to the violence that has plagued 
Latin America for centuries to follow. This reconquering of the Iberian Peninsula 
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occurred from approximately 711 A.D. until 1492 and was the result of the Spanish 
Christians violently pushing out the Muslim African Moors who were occupying the 
territory.30 This period in history was the beginning of the military traditions in Spain and 
established a warrior-priest mentality that brought together the military machine with 
religion, conquest, subordination, and ultimately an authoritarian type of government.31  
As a result of their success in pushing the Moors out of the peninsula, the military 
was rewarded with land and privileges, and were sometimes given special statuses within 
society. Ultimately, “this tradition of religious-cultural warfare, rewards for conquest, 
military privileges, and fusion of military and government authority came with the 
conquistadores (Spanish conqueror) to the new world that Spain called las Indias.”32 
This imperialist style of dominance and conquering has been named the original sin of 
Latin America, as the generations to follow in Latin America are still inheriting the 
violence to this day.33  
From the Spanish Reconquista, the conquistadores brought the institutions and 
religious intolerance that they learned with them to the new world and applied it to the 
native population they encountered. The whole experience created a system based on 
racism, militarism, religion, and land that continued into the different colonies that Spain 
and Portugal established in the new world. From the discovery of Latin America, the 
region was doomed to be a haven for extreme violence and intolerance. Had the warrior-
priest mentality not existed, Latin America would have been settled and colonized in a 
very different way. 
B. COLONIALISM 
With the precedent being set from the Reconquista, the colonization of the new 
world began in a less than desirable fashion for the natives in the region. The emergence 
of the colonies in Latin America brought about new themes in the region, such as 
                                                 
30Loveman, For la Patria, 1.  
31Ibid.  
32Ibid.  
33John Charles Chasteen, Born in Blood & Fire: A Concise History of Latin America, 3rd ed. (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2011), 11.  
 15 
pigmentocracy, mercantilism, and even stronger forms or authoritarianism. These themes 
were present from the time the new world was discovered in 1492 until 1810, as the 
moves towards independence began to emerge. 
One key component of the Spanish and Portuguese colonization of the new world 
to remember is that a hierarchy was established early on in regards to citizen status based 
on the color of one’s skin, or the birthplace of said individual. This is even more 
important as the slave trade brought Africans to the region to work in the harsh 
environments that the Spanish and Portuguese would not. As more people showed up in 
the region, there was a mixing of cultures and skin colors, known as transculturation. 
This mixing of people occurred as Native Americans, Africans, and Spanish/Portuguese 
people lived closely with one another and resulted in “new and distinctive Latin 
American cultures—not Spanish or Portuguese, not indigenous or African, but fusions of 
two or more elements, varying from region to region in kaleidoscopic combinations.”34  
The very nature of the colonies can also be attributed to the violence that the 
region faces. The colonies were extractive, meaning that all of the resources and products 
produced by the Latin Americans were sent back to Europe, and then sold to the Latin 
Americans, leaving the wealth with the Spanish and Portuguese. This system of 
mercantilism left very little wealth to be made for the locals and kept the classes based on 
skin color and birthplace in place. 
Lastly, colonization established stronger forms of authoritarianism in the region, 
as the local population was dominated and subjugated by outside rule. According to John 
Chasteen, “Historians explain colonial control of Latin America as hegemony, a kind of 
domination that implies a measure of consent by those at the bottom.”35 In the eyes of the 
colonizers, as long as the locals remained quiet, they were consenting to rule by an 
outsider and a class structure that always kept them at the bottom, while Europeans were 
the leaders of the government.  
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C. INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS AND POWER VACUUM    
The independence movements in Latin America occurred between 1810 and 1820 
and varied greatly from location to location in terms of violence and struggles. Overall, 
the independence movements brought about new themes in the region—weapons, armies, 
and destruction, while the post-independence period brought about a new period in the 
area characterized by a power vacuum, which opened the door for caudillismo leadership, 
civil wars, and a lack of professionalized armies. 
The movement towards independence was inspired by the examples of the 
Haitian, American, and French revolutions. These revolutions gave rise to the idea that 
Latin America could also have their independence from the colonial rule of Spain and 
Portugal, and give rise to nationalism and liberalism. Not all of the independence 
movements were as violent as the others, and some struggled more in the aftermath to 
piece together a sort of nation by linking together people that had no similarities other 
than they possessed the same dominant ruler before independence, which led to the 
difficulties of the independent nations.36 As the dust from the independence movements 
settled, one thing was clear, “independence did not undo colonialism in Latin American 
nations. Rather, it made them postcolonial—now self-governing, but still shaped by a 
colonial heritage.”37 
The sudden void in leadership amongst the former colonies of Spain left a 
vacuum that needed to be filled. This power vacuum, plus the violence and destruction 
that came with the wars and rebellions during the fights for independence needed to be 
filled by someone or something. The politics that followed the postcolonial region were 
failing, and the military strongmen, or caudillos, soon took over the role of leadership in 
the loosely defined nations. These military leaders would control large amounts of 
territory, especially in the rural areas outside of cities, and offer protection to the people 
and in turn, form militias. According to Loveman, the caudillos “set important precedents 
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for the role of military forces in the region’s international wars and internal conflicts 
during the next chaotic half-century.”38 
The periods following the independence timeframe—conservative and 
liberalism—continued to change the politics of Latin America into the eventual 
democracies that can be seen today. The precedent of authoritarianism, violence, and 
militarism in government was set from the very beginning of Latin American history, and 
can still be seen in the modern day violence that is present today. 
D. MODERN-DAY VIOLENCE 
Latin America, more specifically Central America, also faces threats today that 
continue the trend of violence in the region. The current problem with the maras, or street 
gangs, as well as the presence of drug traffickers and other TCOs, has brought about the 
next wave and level of violence in the region. With the abundance of violence in the 
region, the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala—Figure 1) is 
considered to be one of the most dangerous areas in the world.39 As a result of the 
violence, “government policies seeking to crush or suppress the maras are politically 
popular in most Central American countries.”40 
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Figure 1.  Central America and the Northern Triangle41 
 
 
The violence that the region is known for is brought on by many factors. Each of 
the countries in the Northern Triangle shares common vulnerabilities that must be taken 
into account when discussing the high levels of violence in the region. According to the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the five main vulnerabilities are “geographic 
vulnerabilities, demographic, social, and economic vulnerabilities, limited criminal 
justice capacity, a history of conflict and authoritarianism, and displacement and 
deportation.”42 On top of these vulnerabilities, the notorious street gangs, Mara 
Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) and the 18th street gang, are the cause of many homicides and 
violent acts. Homicide rates have remained high in recent years (Figure 2) and remained 
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steady in 2015 for Honduras and Guatemala, with a significant rise in El Salvador (Figure 
3). To add to this, the drug cartels, especially the Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel, have 
moved into the region to continue the trafficking of large amounts of cocaine, marijuana, 
and heroin. Having a better understanding of the violence in each country is vital to 
understanding how the governments are trying to fight it.  
Figure 2.  2014 Homicide Rates in Latin America43 
 
 
Violence in El Salvador has changed with the times, making the job of preventing 
it much harder. El Salvador is home to many different street gangs, but the most 
notorious, MS-13 and 18th street gang, are responsible for most of the violence. 
Combined with the shipment of massive amounts of illegal drugs and weapons, and 
human trafficking, the violence continues to grow. 
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Figure 3.  2015 Latin America and Caribbean Homicide Rates44  
 
 
The world-renowned gang, MS-13, grew in El Salvador. The gang began like 
most other gangs, out of the desire to protect one’s neighborhood and to have a safe 
haven where one could fit in. These problems were the result of the deportation of gang 
members from the United States back to El Salvador, where they had no ties to anyone. 
As a result, gangs formed out of desperation. According to Sonja Wolf, the gang problem 
in El Salvador has become more violent through the years as members have transitioned 
to more heavy weapons and changed their role in violence, now participating in murder, 
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extortion, and drug sales.45 The changing environment of the gangs, combined with the 
corruption of the police force, and lack of an effective anti-gang policy has caused a 
major security threat to the country.46  
The gangs, particularly MS-13, have also evolved in other ways. As Mexican 
drug cartels began to operate in the area, MS-13 partnered up in a way to contribute to the 
drug sales and trafficking in the region.47 The primary partner of the MS-13 in El 
Salvador is the Zetas cartel, along with other local and regional drug traffickers.48 This 
relationship with the Zetas has become a very lucrative source of income for the gang, as 
they operate with the cartel to traffic humans as well as drugs.49 Also evolving are the 
weapons that are readily available to the gang members. It is not uncommon for gang 
member in El Salvador to have access to automatic weapons, grenades, rocket launchers, 
and high explosives.50 As a result of the increase in weaponry, and relationship with 
TCOs, such as the Mexican drug cartels, the homicide rate in El Salvador was the second 
highest in the region from 2008–2010, at 64.8 murders per 100,000 people, and is the 
highest in the region as of 2015 at 103 murders per 100,000 people.51   
As a result of the increasing homicide rate, a very controversial gang truce was 
declared between the leaders of the MS-13 gang and the 18th street gang in El Salvador 
in 2012. There is much debate as to the role of the Salvadoran government in arranging 
the truce between the two gangs, but the fact remains that after the truce was declared, 
and the homicide rate dropped from an average of 14 murders per day to four murders per 
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day.52 In exchange for the truce, the leaders of the two gangs would be moved from their 
maximum-security prisons to a prison where they would be allowed to have visits, use 
cell phones, and continue to manage the truce. The reduction in violence was a great step 
for El Salvador, but unfortunately, it was not as a result of reforms and anti-gang policies 
from the state, but rather as a result of the gang’s decisions. The lower homicide rates did 
not last long, as they increased by 57% in 2014.53   
There is debate as to the relationship between the MS-13 and 18th street gangs 
with TCOs in El Salvador, but one thing is clear, the gangs in El Salvador have become a 
more serious threat to security and the problem needs to be addressed. According to 
Wolf, “Given El Salvador’s long history of social repression, this culture of violence 
clearly developed over many decades, but the country’s intense and protracted civil war 
aggravated it in important ways.”54 The Salvadoran government must address the 
problem as a whole with an anti-gang policy.     
Not all that dissimilar from El Salvador, Guatemala, has been facing problems of 
violence since its bloody civil war. Guatemala has a large number of youth gang 
members, as well as a high presence of the violent Sinaloa and Zeta Mexican drug cartels 
due to its bordering with Mexico. To add to the problem, Guatemala has been facing an 
increasing level of vigilantism because of the lack of policy from the corrupt police force. 
The youth gang presence in Guatemala that is causing problems today has been 
around since the 1980s.55 These gangs have transformed from that time in order to adapt 
to the changing environment of Guatemala. These gangs—MS-13 and 18th street gang 
most predominately—seemed to become more violent in response to an increase in 
detention from the police force. It can be argued that the gangs actually became stronger, 
more centralized, and more violent as a result of the crackdown on gang members in 
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Guatemala.56 It would be unfair, however, to blame all of the violence in Guatemala on 
the youth gangs. As a matter of fact, many of the gang members are considered to be less 
of a security threat in the region than other factors. Never the less, the gangs of 
Guatemala are a part of the “rampant lawlessness that warrant considerable alarm.”57 
Probably of more concern than the youth gangs in the context of extreme violence 
are the Mexican drug cartels. The cartels seem to operate in the region with impunity. 
Both the Zeta and Sinaloa cartels are the cause of high levels of crime. According to a 
study of crime in the region in 2010, “the principal driver of violence in the region was 
the illegal drug trade, outranking other possible factors such as the prevalence of youth 
gangs, the availability of firearms, and the legacy of past conflict.”58 These cartels are 
also recruiting skilled gang members of MS-13, providing military style training, and 
then utilizing them for killings in the region.59 To make matters worse, Guatemala suffers 
from extremely weak institutions, which allow the cartels to operate freely without fear of 
the justice system.  
Weak institutions, especially with security and human rights, are a key underlying 
factor that has led to an increase in violence in the country.60 The police force is corrupt, 
and often times are controlled by the cartels. The prisons in Guatemala are controlled by 
the gangs, oftentimes resulting in uprisings, bloody fights between rival gangs, and 
assaults on prison guards.61 According to Elin Cecilie Ranum, “Guatemalan authorities 
have not managed to institutionalize a legal framework for either repression or prevention 
of violent crime, which shows Guatemala’s institutional weakness.”62 
As a result of the high number of youth gangs and cartel activities, and the lack of 
legal success in investigating and prosecuting violent acts, citizens of Guatemala have 
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begun to turn towards acts of vigilantism.63 The main victims of the vigilante groups are 
young men involved in gang activity. The idea of “social cleansing” has been born from 
the many problems and lack of solutions on part of the Guatemalan government. These 
extrajudicial killings are actually becoming part of the bigger problem of violence. 
Unfortunately, in the absence of a solution or policy from the state, the citizens feel that 
taking matters into their own hands is the best solution. The citizens involved in planning 
and carrying out the killings range from local citizens trying to defend themselves from 
violence to high-level politicians, such as former congressman and police officers.64 
Overall, Guatemala’s high level of violence is the result of a history of conflict, 
weak institutions, youth gangs, cartels, drug trafficking, and vigilantism. As gangs adapt 
and the drug trade continues, the violence will continue to grow. The government must 
find a solution to end the violence, and has institutions in place that are taking steps to 
promote the rule of law and enforce democratic judicial standards, such as the 
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).65   
Criminal violence in Honduras is just as prevalent, if not more so than in the other 
Northern Triangle countries. It is important to note that even though Honduras did not 
face a bloody civil war like El Salvador and Guatemala, the foundation of violence in the 
society was still established during the 1980s and 1990s. This violence is based on 
several key components, such as youth gangs, drug trafficking, cartels, corrupt police 
forces, extreme poverty, and broken families. 
The gang epidemic that El Salvador and Guatemala face did not escape Honduras. 
Just like its neighbors, Honduras has the same problem with the MS-13 and 18th street 
gangs. The history of the gang activity in Honduras extends back to the 1980s with 
localized street gangs in the region.66 These smaller, local gangs were no more than a 
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nuisance to the local populations and were not considered a security threat by today’s 
standards.67 However, as the United States began to increase the number of criminals 
being deported, the same cycle of violence that the other countries faced occurred in 
Honduras as well. The deported gang members brought with them a more organized and 
violent type of gang mentality and soon absorbed the local gangs that were prevalent in 
Honduras.68 As with the other countries in the region, the MS-13 and 18th street gangs 
became the most popular gangs in the country and are responsible for contract killings, 
assaults, robberies, extortions, kidnappings, and drug sales.69 Despite the relatively 
peaceful history of Honduras—compared to the civil wars of El Salvador and 
Guatemala—Honduras has been noted as having the highest number of gang members in 
the region.70 This is a result of the extreme poverty and broken families that many 
Honduran youths are raised in. One difference that is important to note in Honduras is 
that the gangs are, for the most part, absent from the drug trafficking business. The gangs 
are usually not present in the specific regions of Honduras where the drug traffickers and 
cartels are operating.71 In addition, the gangs are viewed as “undisciplined and unreliable 
partners” from the cartels.72 
It is argued that the presence of cartels in Honduras is a major contributor to the 
high levels of violence and crime. Specifically, the Sinaloa cartel has been noted as 
running their entire Central American operations from Honduras.73 With the lack of gang 
presence in the regions where the cartels are working, there has been increased violence 
amongst cartels and TCOs as they attempt to control territory to benefit their 
operations.74 These TCOs and cartels have also been operating with impunity in the 
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country due to the weak institutions and high levels of corruption in the military, police, 
and justice institutions. They have specifically been identified as infiltrating these 
institutions in Honduras.75  
Despite lacking a civil war, the legacy of violence in Honduras remains. From 
local gang problems to TCOs, the levels of violence continue to rise. As seen in the other 
Northern Triangle countries, the use of hard tactics and policies has only caused an 
increase in violence and the increased capabilities of the criminals. Gang members are 
adapting to their environment and are now harder to identify and detain as a result of 
these policies.76 The more recent developments in Honduras to promote gang prevention 
rather than anti-gang policies is a step in the right direction, but with the state of the 
economy, lack of sufficient funding and coordination between programs, violence is 
likely to remain.  
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III. MILITARY ROLES IN THE PRESENCE OF VIOLENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On January 8, 2016, the New York Times published the story of the recapture of 
one of Mexico’s most notorious drug lords, El Chapo Guzman.77 The images released 
from Mexico depicting El Chapo being escorted in handcuffs by both Mexican Soldiers 
and Marines, instead of police officers, bring to mind a central question in the study of 
military and society. As in other parts of the world, several Latin American countries are 
utilizing their military forces to aid the police in an attempt to gain the upper hand on the 
violence. How does the constant presence of criminal violence in a country change its 
military as an institution? How does using the armed forces as police change the military 
itself? Why do the governments of the Northern Triangle countries choose to utilize their 
militaries to address the growing levels of violence? Some of the conventional arguments 
recommend that militaries should not, if at all possible, be used as a police-like force. I 
argue that using the police as military changes the armed forces in the following ways. 
First, the armed forces overall training and doctrine shifts from a focus on counter-
insurgency and external defense to one of internal security. Second, the armed forces find 
themselves ill equipped to conduct external-defense missions, as the operational 
equipment they employ and operate is suited to internal security threats. Third, the 
overall mission changes the military to a force that is unable to successfully operate in 
traditional military roles as a result of the changes noted above. The reason for the use of 
the military is that it is a stronger bureaucratic apparatus in which to accomplish the 
security needs than the police forces, which were gutted by post-civil-war reforms, and 
the government is seeking an immediate solution to the violence and views the military as 
the best answer.  
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In order to address the question more fully, and to elaborate on this argument, this 
chapter unfolds as follows. First, I analyze the cases of El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras. Second, I provide analysis as to how the militaries in the region have changed. 
Last, I provide analysis on the benefits and detriments of using militaries in a police 
mission. 
B. CASE ANALYSIS OF EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND HONDURAS 
As discussed in Chapter II, Central America has had its share of violence. These 
states have experienced violence throughout their history from fighting amongst Mayan 
city-states, the bloodletting of the Spanish conquest, indigenous rebellions, and cold war. 
These conflicts have imprinted themselves on the institutions of the region. Today, 
criminal violence is the course de jour.  To contend with this violence, the state relies on 
both the police and their military institutions. How does the presence of criminal violence 
affect the role and missions of the military?  More specifically, what were the missions of 
the military immediately following transitions to democracy, and what are the follow-on 
modern-day missions of the military since democratic governments were established? 
The delta between the two will help answer this question. 
1. El Salvador—Military Missions and Role after 1992 Peace Agreement  
El Salvador has historically been one of the most violent states in Central 
America. Prior to the establishment of a democratic regime, El Salvador was plunged into 
a violent and bloody civil war from 1980 until 1992. On January 16, 1992, the official 
peace agreement between the government of El Salvador, and the Farabundo Martí 
National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla group was signed in the Chapultepec Castle 
in Mexico City.78 The 1992 peace agreement became known as the Chapultepec Peace 
Agreement. With the assistance of the United Nations (UN), the agreement was going to 
be implemented, ultimately ending the civil war and establishing a democratic regime in 
El Salvador. 
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 The most important chapter of the peace agreement was chapter one, which 
detailed the specific requirements of the military as they transitioned from a political 
force to a democratic institution under the purview of the civilian control. According to 
chapter one, the military had 13 specific tasks or requirements that had to be met in order 
to successfully implement the agreement.79 The most important sections of the agreement 
pertaining to the armed forces for the purposes of this chapter of the research, were 
doctrinal principles of the armed forces, educational system of the armed forces, 
reduction, public security forces, and paramilitary bodies. The following will discuss the 
requirements of each of these sections below in more detail. 
The first section of importance—doctrinal principles of the armed forces—
established the very basic guidelines for the military forces in El Salvador to follow. It 
specifically states, “The mission of the armed forces is to defend the sovereignty of the 
State and the integrity of its territory.”80 The section also details the expectations of the 
armed forces as “obedient, professional, apolitical, and non-deliberative,” in their role as 
an institution of the state.81 Of most importance, the doctrinal section differentiates the 
missions of defense of the nation and security.82 Specifically, it identifies that the defense 
of the nation from external military threats is the responsibility of the military, and 
security is a broader idea that includes “economic, political and social aspects which go 
beyond the constitutional sphere of the competence of the armed forces and are the 
responsibility of other sectors of society and of the State.”83 According to the section, 
fighting against an internal security threat is outside the realm of the military, unless the 
other institutions are unable to meet the threat, in which case the use of the military is an 
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option as a last resort.84 Understanding this section of the agreement is imperative in 
order to grasp the democratic ideals that El Salvador was trying to move towards. 
The next important detail outlined in chapter one of the peace agreement outlines 
the educational system for the military. According to this section, the military was to be 
educated in many different areas in order to fulfill the professional role that they were 
required to be. Specifically, the military was to be trained in “the pre-eminence of human 
dignity and democratic values, respect for human rights and the subordination of such 
forces to the constitutional authorities.”85 Furthermore, the members of the armed forces 
were encouraged to participate in the country’s universities in order to further develop 
themselves as well-rounded and educated individuals.86  
Another important aspect of the changes the military would face after the peace 
agreements were implemented was the reduction of the size of the military force. The 
agreement called for the scaling back of the military in several areas, including individual 
units, personnel, officer corps, equipment, facilities, and spending.87 The agreements 
make note that the size of the force must be appropriate to the missions and doctrine that 
was outlined in the first section of chapter one. A significant reduction in personnel was 
the highlight of the requirements. The force had to be “reduced to approximately thirty-
one thousand over a two-year period.”88 One thing the agreements made clear was that 
the size of the force needed to be reduced in order to minimize the chances of the military 
gaining control again, both militarily and politically. 
Further requirements for the military were outlined in the public security forces 
and paramilitary bodies sections of the peace agreement. According to the public security 
forces section, the internal security of El Salvador is the responsibility of the National 
Civil Police, which is a separate entity, controlled by a different civilian authority than 
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the military.89 Furthermore, the National Guard and Treasury Police, which were 
functioning as security forces within the country, were to be abolished and absorbed into 
the army, leaving public security entirely to the police.90 Under the paramilitary bodies 
section of the chapter, the agreement states that any civil defense unit must be banned, 
and any private security force or paramilitary force must be governed by the rule of law 
and transparent in their activities.91 The main purpose behind these specific requirements 
was to ensure that no military group or military-style group was able to slip into the same 
style of control that led to the civil war and violence in the first place.  
2. Recent Military Missions in Democratic El Salvador 
Since the establishment of democracy in 1992, El Salvador has had many 
successes, despite the continuing growth of violence and street gangs. The presidential 
elections have been fairly executed, with the majority of the competition being between 
the National Republic Alliance (ARENA) and the FMLN. The economy was still 
struggling, with a large portion of the GDP coming from remittances from those 
Salvadorans that fled to the United States during the bloody civil war. The main problem 
that has continued to plague the country to this day is the high level of violence from the 
street gangs and drug cartels that operate in El Salvador. In an attempt to mitigate these 
problems, the presidents of El Salvador have leaned on the military to take to the streets 
to assist the PNC with securing the state internally, despite the requirements laid out in 
chapter one of the 1992 peace agreement.  
There have been major changes to the military in El Salvador. The first and most 
noticeable one is the successful reduction in the sheer size of the Salvadoran military. At 
the peak of the violence in the civil war, the Salvadoran military numbered approximately 
63,000 personnel, but was successfully cut to the required number according to the peace 
agreement, and then continued to cut to approximately 15,000 personnel by 1999.92 The 
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current number of personnel in the Salvadoran military remains steady, with 14,200 in 
the army, 1,175 in the navy, and 790 personnel in the air force.93 This movement towards 
a smaller, and ideally, less politically powerful military is imperative in diminishing the 
control and resources the military has had available to it in the past.  
Despite the diminished size of the military, the missions they have performed are 
not necessarily in-line with the detailed missions and doctrine spelled out from the peace 
agreement. As a matter of fact, many of the presidential candidates running for office in 
El Salvador have run with a mano dura, or iron fist, mentality, and have promoted the use 
of the military to fight against violence in the country. President Francisco Flores Pérez 
was the first to implement the tough policies against gangs, with President Antonio Saca 
following in his footsteps.94 When President Mauricio Funes took office, he officially 
implemented the use of the military to combat the violence on the streets of El Salvador, 
despite initially running for office with an alternate approach than mano dura.95 The 
initial plan presented by Funes was going to use 3,000 troops combined with an equal 
number of police but ended with the use of approximately 6,300 troops from the army.96 
This precedent opened the door for continued use of the armed forces for internal security 
threats. 
The Salvadoran Army remains at the forefront of the fight against gangs and 
narcotics, despite the requirements and attempts to transition to an external threat-based 
force. There are currently four battalions within the army that fight with the police in a 
national security effort, titled, “Plan de Campaña Nuevo Amanecer,” or Campaign Plan 
New Dawn, each of which have their own task forces.97 The most recent developments 
include the development of a new rapid reaction force, comprising of 600 troops and 400 
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police officers.98 The underdeveloped and under-resourced Salvadoran Navy also plays a 
role in counter-drug operations as they patrol the country’s territorial waters and attempt 
to mitigate drug smugglers from moving drugs in and out of the country; however, the 
navy also consists of a naval infantry unit, consisting of approximately 185 personnel, 
which trains and fights with the army.99 The air force is also doing its part in the drug 
interdiction mission by assisting the navy and army with support from the air.100  
Examples of the military’s involvement in internal security can be seen 
throughout the news. According to Insight Crime, President Salvador Sánchez Cerén 
announced in May 2015 that the country would be sending three battalions, with 
approximately 200 troops in each, to ramp up the fight against the gangs and violence in 
the country, totaling approximately 7,000 troops deployed within the borders of the 
country to assist police officers in the fight against violence.101 In other news releases, 
the new 1,000 man strong team of police officers and military troops made headlines as 
the president announced that the team will find and capture the top 100 gang leaders who 
are currently hiding in the countryside since the gang crackdown in the cities has left 
them with nowhere to hide.102  
3. Guatemala—Military Missions and Role after 1996 Peace Accord 
Guatemala, like El Salvador, was faced with an extremely violent and bloody civil 
war, which lasted for 36 years, and ultimately, ended up taking over 200,000 lives. The 
transition away from a military authoritarian regime and toward a democracy was 
initiated when President Álvaro Arzú began a series of agreements between the 
government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG) that ultimately 
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ended with the signing of the Final Peace Accord on December 29, 1996.103 The 
agreement of the most importance to this research specifically—the Agreement on the 
Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic 
Society—was signed on September 19, 1996, which resulted in a limit on the military’s 
authority within the borders of the country, and specified the role, doctrine, size, 
deployment, and training of the Guatemalan armed forces.104   
The agreement detailed all of the different branches of the government and 
provided the requirements for the armed forces within the required branches. The first 
important piece within the agreement that pertains to the military, states that the army is 
only responsible for the “protection against external armed threats,” and the “protection 
against threats to the public order and internal security” are the priority of the police.105 
However, the document also states that the military’s involvement in other mission areas 
is only to be of a cooperative nature, as they are solely responsible for defending the 
sovereignty and territory of Guatemala.106 Along the same line as in El Salvador, the 
agreement defines the military as a “permanent institution in the service of the nation,” 
which is “unique and indivisible, essentially professional, apolitical, loyal and non-
deliberative.”107 
Further detail on the new missions and role of the military is specified in the 
agreement under the military doctrine, size and resources, and educational system 
sections. According to these sections, the military’s new doctrine is based on the 
constitution, with strict adherence to human rights, and a strong enforcement of the 
borders, sovereignty, and independence of Guatemala.108 When it comes to the size of 
the armed forces, the agreement has two locations that discuss the new requirements for 
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the country. The first location merely states that the size of the military will only be as 
big as needed in order to successfully complete the mission—defending the borders and 
sovereignty of the country; however, the second location within the agreement provides 
further detail, stating that the military should be reorganized in 1997 in order for them to 
meet the tasks of “national defence, border patrol and protection of sea, land and air 
jurisdiction,” and should be reduced by 33 percent in total size.109 One unit that is 
specifically called out in the agreement as being required to disband is the mobile 
military police, based on the newfound peace that Guatemala was expecting to be in.110  
Similar to El Salvador, Guatemala detailed the training and education 
requirements for the armed forces in their peace agreement. The education system is 
supposed to be based on the rule of law, with a foundation of democracy, and especially 
focusing in on human rights and Guatemalan history.111 The training received by the 
armed forces was directed to highlight the position of the armed forces in the eyes of the 
public, and “to guarantee the dignity of those involved.”112 The agreements made it very 
clear that the military was no longer going to be receiving training to use the maximum 
force necessary, but rather to have a use of force escalation scale that would allow them 
to resolve any conflicts at the lowest level, and always with the people and their rights in 
mind.  
The last major takeaway from the peace agreements in terms of the military is the 
president’s ability to use the military. According to the agreement, “when the ordinary 
means for the maintenance of public order and domestic peace are exhausted, the 
President of the Republic may exceptionally use the armed forces for this purpose. The 
deployment of the armed forces shall always be temporary, shall be conducted under 
civilian authority and shall not involve any limitation on the exercise of the constitutional 
rights of citizens.”113 Guatemala specifically gave the president permission to use the 
                                                 






military in an internal security role, so long as the president followed strict protocol and 
guidelines. This allows more flexibility within the government to combat any violent 
threat or opposition to the state that becomes too powerful for other democratic 
institutions—such as the police—to effectively negate the threat.  
4. Recent Military Missions in Democratic Guatemala 
The democratic periods of Guatemalan politics, from 1996 to present, has 
continued to face many problems with inequality, human rights violations, corruption, 
and high levels of violence. There were many setbacks throughout the democratic 
regimes that tested the will of the Guatemalans. The trend of violence from local street 
gangs, drug cartels, and organized crime continued to be the biggest problem for the 
democratic regime. As a result, in 2004, President Óscar Berger ordered the military onto 
the streets to fight the violence with the police force.114 Homicide rates continued to rise, 
as did the problems with the government. More recently, the violence has declined 
slightly, but the problems within Guatemala still remain. The more recent 2007 and 2011 
elections resulted in killings of numerous politicians and activists, proving that the high 
crime rate is still linked to the same problems that were seen in the civil war.115 As 
Guatemala moves forward, the economic inequalities, human rights violations, and 
violence will continue to be on the forefront of the minds of the politicians, military, 
police, and citizens of the country. 
As mentioned above, the president in Guatemala has the ability to deploy military 
personnel within the borders of the country in order to combat the violent threat that runs 
the country. It was not long before this practice began, and seemed to become a 
permanent use of the military. In 2004, Berger, in response to high levels of crime and 
violence, ordered approximately 1,600 military personnel to the streets to assist the police 
force with stopping the murders and violence.116 From this point forward, the military 
has become an expected part of everyday security within Guatemala. 
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One aspect of the military side of the peace agreements that Guatemala was 
successful in transitioning after the regime shift was the reduction in size of the military. 
Like El Salvador, Guatemala made a dramatic change in the size of the military force, 
shrinking down to the current size of 19,200 in the army, 576 in the navy, and 990 in the 
air force.117 These numbers are far less than the number of armed forces during the 
bloody, 36-year long civil war that politicized and strengthened the military.  
The overall mission of the armed forces has not been a conventional military 
mission, but rather a non-traditional mission that includes internal security, despite the 
requirements listed in the military peace agreement. The army’s role in fighting crime 
and violence was steady from the 1996 peace agreements until 2010, when President Otto 
Pérez Molina decided to strengthen the army’s presence in the streets as well as increase 
their funding, leading to new brigade-sized units being created.118 The Guatemalan Navy, 
which serves the purpose of a coast guard unit due to its minimal size and lack of 
resources, focuses its patrols to counter narcotics and attempts to keep the border secure 
from Belize along the inland rivers that separate the two countries.119 In the latter role, 
the navy is functioning in more of a traditional role by protecting the sovereignty and 
borders of Guatemala. The air force also seems to be functioning more in-line with 
traditional military missions by protecting Guatemalan air space and assisting with 
natural disasters, as well as assisting with other law enforcement agencies when 
needed.120 
As in El Salvador, it is easy to find current examples of the Guatemalan armed 
forces participating in non-traditional missions in the news. According to David Gagne, 
the United Nations have shown their disagreement with Guatemala’s choice to deploy its 
military in the country for internal security missions, stating that that use of the military 
has not helped minimize the violence, but instead has possibly been a contributing factor 
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to the rise in the homicide rate in the country.121 Other news criticizes President Jimmy 
Morales for his announcement that the military would continue to assist the police force 
with internal security after he already stated that he would begin to remove the military 
presence from the joint police/military efforts during the second half of 2016.122 Despite 
the requirements laid out in the agreement, it appears as though the Guatemalan armed 
forces are going to continue to function in a police-like role until further notice.  
5. Honduras—Military Missions and Roles after Transition to 
Democracy 
Honduras, unlike El Salvador and Guatemala, transitioned to democracy on their 
own free will, not because of a bloody civil war that led to a peace agreement. The initial 
transition took place when General Paz—the leader of the military authoritarian regime—
decided it was best for the military to relinquish power to the civilians instead of taking 
the chance to have a civil war or revolution that would likely hurt the military.123 One 
can argue that without a civil war taking place, the military was able to maintain power 
behind the scenes—and without civilian control—despite having democratically elected 
presidents in charge of the government. It was not until 1996 that the military really felt 
the effects of democracy with a cut in the budget, a reduction in the size of the force, and 
a transfer of power to civilian control, which is why some argue that Honduras was not a 
civilian democracy until 1996.124 Despite these facts, Honduras did transfer control from 
the military to the civilians and based the government off of a newly founded 
constitution, which was signed in 1982. Within the new constitution, the armed forces 
had specific requirements, though they were not as stringent as they were in El Salvador 
and Guatemala. 
Within the Honduran Constitution, there is a specific chapter dedicated solely to 
the armed forces: Chapter X. This chapter contains several articles from article 272 to 
                                                 
121David Gagne, “UN Chastises Guatemala on Militarization of Security,” InSight Crime, 26 March 
2015, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/un-chastises-guatemala-on-militarization-of-security.  
122Michael Lohmuller, “Guatemala Extends Use of Military in Policing Role,” InSight Crime, 6 July 
2016, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/guatemala-extends-use-of-military-in-policing-role.  
123Booth, Understanding Central America, 218.  
124Ibid., 220.  
 39 
article 293, each providing different nuanced information about the requirements of the 
armed forces. According to the first article, the Honduran armed forces “are a National 
Institution of permanent and essentially professional, apolitical, obedient and non-
deliberative character.”125 The military is specifically tasked with the defense of the 
borders and sovereignty of Honduras, as well as maintaining peace and good order, and 
enforcing the rule of law.126 A major difference between the peace agreements of El 
Salvador and Guatemala and the constitution of Honduras is that Honduras does not 
provide as much detail in the mission areas or separation of internal and external security. 
For example, the only specific tasks of the armed forces detailed in the constitution are to 
“cooperate with the Executive Power in the tasks of literacy training, education, 
agriculture, conservation of national resources, highways, communications, health, 
agrarian reform and in emergency situations.”127 Furthermore, the constitution 
specifically detailed that the armed forces of Honduras would operate under the direct 
supervision of the “Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,” who would be controlled 
directly by the Honduran president.128  
Several articles later in the constitution made it clear that the entire country would 
be organized and divided into different military regions for “reasons of national 
security.”129 The Commander-in-Chief of the military also allowed for each region to be 
divided further into districts in order to delineate the areas of responsibility for each unit. 
This mentality is quite different than what was seen in El Salvador and Guatemala, which 
were trying to limit the use of the military within the boundaries of the country for any 
reason. This is all due, in part, to the way in which civilians took control of the country. 
The military was still able to remain powerful and active within the country because there 
was not a civil war that led to the minimization of power that the armed forces had. 
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Other key differences that highlight the continued strength and political power of 
the military in Honduras after the initial transition to democracy are outlined in Articles 
288 and 289, which discuss the commission and training of the armed forces. 
Specifically, Article 288 states that personnel who desire a commission into the armed 
forces will be formerly educated at designated military training facilities, which will train 
them on the requirements that the military needs at the time.130 Next, Article 289 
identifies the College of National Defense as the premier institution for military 
education, “responsible for the training of select military and civilian personnel so that 
they may participate jointly in the national strategic planning in the political, economic, 
social and military fields.”131 This article alone highlights the fact that the military is still 
strategically placing itself in the position to affect the political outcome of the country, 
despite being a democracy led by civilian rule.    
6. Recent Military Missions in Democratic Honduras 
The majority of the problems that Honduras has faced have been in recent years 
after the military transferred power to the civilians. The division amongst the people in 
the country grew, but transitions between leaders after elections were very smooth, giving 
hope that Honduras was on its way to a full-fledged democracy. The crime rate from both 
gangs and organized crime became a major issue facing politicians in Honduras during 
the recent period of civilian rule. Homicide rates were high, and the government opted to 
utilize the military to assist the highly corrupt police forces in combating the violence.132 
To make matters worse, in 2009, a coup removed President Manuel Zelaya from office in 
an attempt to allow democratic leadership to continue.133 As the legal battle and conflict 
between political parties and the military continued, crime organizations—gangs, 
organized crime, and drug traffickers—utilized the distraction to infiltrate the country 
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even more.134 Honduras is in a politically dangerous position at this time, with major 
problems of corruption and violence.  
With the use of the military as a policing force becoming the norm in Honduras, 
as with El Salvador and Guatemala, the government has been making the necessary 
changes to the constitution. The changes began in November 2011, when the government 
declared a state of emergency in order to grant the military policing powers, and was 
followed up in 2013 when the Honduran Congress approved a bill allowing the creation 
of a new unit consisting of elite military personnel with the capacity to operate in a 
policing mission in order to combat the organized crime that the country was facing.135 
Also, in 2012, President Porfirio Lobo Sosa of Honduras, envisioning the fight against 
crime as a long-term confrontation, made a proposition to amend the constitution in order 
to give the military the power to perform internal policing missions indefinitely.136 
Despite the political power the military retained after the initial transition to 
democracy, the armed forces in Honduras are considerably smaller now than they were 
prior to civilian rule, as the many changes to the constitution have occurred. Currently, 
the Honduran Army is at a rather low strength of 7,200 personnel, consisting of five 
brigades, five independent battalions, one armored cavalry regiment, and two special-
forces battalions.137 The navy currently has 1,400 personnel with 500 reserve personnel, 
and the air force strength is slightly larger with 2,250 personnel.138 Even though the 
original changes to the constitution did not regulate the required size of the military, the 
Honduran armed forces have seen many ups and downs in their strength and equipment. 
The current missions of the army, navy, and air force are also in-line with El 
Salvador and Guatemala, with the government re-purposing the forces to combat the 
growing internal violence in the country. The army is still in existence with the primary 
                                                 
134Booth, Understanding Central America, 224.  
135“Honduras,” InSight Crime, 21 June 2016, http://www.insightcrime.org/honduras-organized-crime-
news/honduras.  
136Ibid.  
137IHS Jane’s, “Honduras-Army,” 16 September 2016, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1319235.  
138IHS Jane’s, "Honduras-Navy," 21 September 2016, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1322694; 
IHS Jane’s, “Honduras-Air Force,” 20 September 2016, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1319045.  
 42 
purpose of external defense, but as with the other Northern Triangle countries, the 
external threat is minimal, if it is in existence all, so the army has been used in the 
policing role, especially in the anti-gang/organized crime and counter-drug areas.139 The 
navy, not really serving in the “blue-water” mission area serves primarily as a coast 
guard, but is relatively inefficient due to a lack of equipment and technology.140 The air 
force used to be the premier military branch in Honduras, however, the function of the air 
force has diminished and it serves to assist the other branches as well as conduct counter-
drug operations.141 
Examples of the armed forces operating within the borders of Honduras as a 
policing force can be seen in the media sources just the same as El Salvador and 
Guatemala. One of the publicized events that took place in recent years was the creation 
of a new elite military police unit known as the Tigers. Combining 200 total personnel 
from both the military and the police, the “Troop of Intelligence and Special Security 
Response Teams (Tigers, for its initials in Spanish),” was the first major development in 
the countries use of the military to fight organized crime.142 The next major event in 
Honduras was the creation of the Military Police of Public Order (PMOP). The PMOP 
was created out of 900 military personnel to work in a wide range of missions “from 
recovering city spaces that have been taken over by street gangs to combating organized 
crime and making arrests.”143 More recent developments with the PMOP came as 
President Juan Orlando Hernández requested a popular referendum in order to include the 
unit in the constitution, despite the Congress voting against the inclusion of the unit.144 
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The referendum will be voted on in November 2017 during the upcoming election 
cycle.145  
C. ANALYSIS PART I: HOW DOES POLICE WORK CHANGE THE 
MILITARY? 
The changes that occurred in each country from the initial transition to democratic 
governance to the current times mark a significant change in the direction and mindset of 
the militaries. The original plan in the Northern Triangle countries was to remove the 
military from the political sphere and minimize their power within the state by strictly 
defining the militaries’ role to protection of the borders and sovereignty of each country. 
This view of the military—as a strictly democratic institution—quickly began to shift, 
however, as the crime wave in each country grew to a level that was unable to be 
mitigated with a police force alone. As a result, the presence of crime and violence 
changed the military in the primary equipment they use, the training and doctrine they 
focus on, and as demonstrated above, the overall missions and focus of the militaries. 
Evaluating the current equipment inventory for each country’s military reveals a 
major change in the missions and mindset of the militaries—from one of external defense 
to internal security. In El Salvador, the Army’s primary equipment consists of armored 
patrol vehicles, with the three newest purchases (in 2009, 2011, and 2013) consisting of 
Humvees and armored vehicles that offer protection for the soldiers conducting raids and 
other internal operations in a city environment.146 According to Santiago Wills Pedraza, 
“Army Troops are using M1151 Enhanced Armament Carriers, upgraded versions of the 
HMMWVS (Humvees), M1165 Control MRC Radio Trucks, modified pick-up trucks 
and locally made armored vehicles like the VCTA1 and VCTA2 to provide cover and 
support during urban operations.”147 Similarly, the Salvadoran Air Force and Navy is 
more equipped for internal security, as the Air Force’s planes consist of A-37 
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Dragonfly’s for interception and several other platforms only used for transport or 
surveillance and reconnaissance, and the Navy’s ships consisting solely of patrol craft for 
inshore, coastal, and riverine operations.148  
Guatemalan and Honduran militaries are no different with the primary focus of 
their equipment being suited to combat the internal security threat. In Guatemala, the 
Army’s only major purchase since the peace agreements came in 2013 when they bought 
53 Jeep CJ8s to provide a light armored vehicle for patrols within the country.149 The 
Guatemalan Air Force and Navy are also better equipped to fight internally with the 
majority of the Air Force serving the transport and utility purpose and the Navy serving 
the coast guard purpose with patrol craft and interceptor craft operating in the littorals.150 
Almost identically, the Honduran Army, Air Force, and Navy are ill-equipped to actually 
face any severe external threat. The Army is lacking in armored vehicles and is focusing 
on the need to have patrol vehicles and command and control components to be better 
suited to fight the organized crime in the country.151 The Air Force and Navy are in the 
same position with intercept aircraft, logistics and utility planes, and intercept watercraft, 
and coastal and riverine patrol craft in the Navy, with no ability to operate in the blue-
water arena.152  
Also, as noted in the aforementioned cases, the overall mission of the militaries 
has changed as a result of the high levels of crime and violence in the countries. This 
change in missions, coupled with the reduced size of the militaries has had a direct 
impact on the training and doctrine. The doctrine in El Salvador, which was initially 
focused on a counter-insurgency role during the civil war has been adjusted as necessary 
to include the new role of combating the countries rampant drug trafficking and gang 
problem.153 The same changes from traditional military operations and counter-
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insurgency roles in the Guatemalan armed forces and Honduran armed forces to counter-
crime roles have required adaptations and changes in the military’s doctrine. In 
Guatemala, realization that an external threat is minimal added with the military’s 
internal security role has changed the doctrine to focus more on the actual threat than on 
the ideal military missions of external defense.154 Honduras was attempting to return to a 
normal military mission mindset until 2011, when they were once again being utilized 
internally to fight the counter-narcotic mission, ultimately changing their doctrine to 
focus internally, as the primary threat to the nation’s sovereignty is the wide range of 
violence within the borders.155   
D. ANALYSIS PART II: WHY DO GOVERNMENTS USE MILITARIES AS 
POLICE? 
In the context of the violence, as described in Chapter II, why do the governments 
of the Northern Triangle countries choose to utilize their militaries to address the growing 
levels of violence? There are many different opinions and answers to this question, but 
the primary reasons that will be addressed all have to do with the government’s and 
citizen’s desire to end the violence now, the weak institutions that exist in Central 
America, the lack of resources, and the lack of alternate options. All of these reasons 
justify the use in the eyes of the governments. 
As El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras transitioned from military 
authoritarianism to a democratic regime, the desire was to minimize the use of the 
militaries since they were the main source of repression and violence. In order to better 
understand why the use of the military and military force is considered an option, one 
must first identify the threat to security, the nation, and the people of the countries. As 
David Pion-Berlin discusses in his book, Military Missions in Democratic Latin America, 
the threats that these countries are facing with the above-described groups—TCOs, drug 
traffickers, cartels, and street gangs—are considered to be mid-level threats that do at 
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times threaten national security and always threaten public security.156 As such, it is not 
unexpected that a military response is a reasonable solution, especially when considering 
that these threats can possibly match the military in capabilities, numbers, and 
weapons.157 In other words, one must fight crime with a reasonable and appropriate level 
of force. It is also important to note the institutional differences between the police and 
military forces. Police forces are not trained to fight in a coordinated effort with other 
police officers, and would, therefore, be at a disadvantage when fighting the larger and 
more organized drug cartels, no matter how many police officers were present.158 The 
police forces also differ from the military in regards to their capacity to use high levels of 
force. Typical police officers would carry pistols as well as an array of non-lethal or less-
than-lethal weapons such as pepper spray and batons.159 The military, on the other hand, 
is trained to fight with coordination and command and control with a larger amount of the 
needed firepower than the police have.160 Police officers transit from one location to 
another in their patrol cars, which have limited capability in combating violence, whereas 
military units have many more options such as armored personnel carriers and tanks.161 
The military forces are trained from early in their careers to follow orders and to use any 
means necessary to complete the assigned mission, and police are trained to “respond as 
individuals to citizens in distress.”162 For all of these reasons, it is evident why the 
military is a better option to fight the criminal organizations that are rampant in the 
region.   
The weak democratic institutions also play a major role in the reason for why the 
military is being used for internal security. As mentioned time and again above, the 
institutions in all three of the Northern Triangle countries are weak and suffer from 
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corruption and an inability to satisfactorily complete the job. The police suffer from the 
inability to do their job, a lack of proper training, and high levels of corruption.163 The 
criminal justice systems also add to the problem with ineffective investigations, lack of 
convictions, prison overpopulation, lack of reform for inmates, and corruption. As a 
result of these problems, the military is relied upon to serve as a “stop gap” and a quick 
fix for the violence in the region.164 
Another important aspect to consider is the desire of the people. An 
overwhelming majority of the people in each of the countries of the Northern Triangle 
would like to see the military being used as an internal police force. Studies in El 
Salvador show that as many as 83 percent of the people who were asked do favor having 
the military on the street to serve as an additional police force, with similar numbers 
appearing in Guatemala and Honduras.165 In fact, the people have been noted as 
pressuring their political leaders to enforce tough anti-gang policies and use military 
force to even the playing field.166 With the corrupt police forces and weak judicial 
institutions that plague the region, people are viewing the military as the only viable 
option to mitigate the crime epidemic.167 It is quite a surprise to see the masses in support 
of the military given the violent history of repression and brutalities that ensued prior to 
the democratization of the states. The support of the military by the people, therefore, 
should be viewed as a sign of a last resort.  
Another aspect that could be viewed as a reason for the use of military personnel 
in internal policing and security is the lack of alternate resources. It would be an 
understatement to say that the police in each of the three countries are overwhelmed with 
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the task of fighting the violence in their countries.168 Not only are they overwhelmed by 
the seemingly impossible task of countering the violence, but they are also lacking the 
resources in terms of weapons, personnel, tactics, and will to fight. As a result, the 
military is viewed as a good option that has all of the necessary resources to counter the 
gangs and drug cartels. Another aspect of the police is that they simply are not ready. 
According to Sarah Kinosian during her podcast with the Washington Office on Latin 
America (WOLA), the reforms that are taking place within the police forces take time, 
and the government does not have the time to sit and wait for the reforms to be effective 
before they counter the violence.169 The government must act now if they want to lower 
the homicide rate and minimize the impact that the criminals are having on their 
countries; therefore, they tend to rely on the military to engage immediately. Another 
interesting aspect to consider is that the militaries in these countries do not really have 
any other missions that take precedence. The country’s militaries are not conducting 
missions against external enemies or fighting other countries for control of territory; 
therefore, the military is a viable resource that can be utilized to assist the police 
forces.170 For these reasons, some might view not using the militaries as a failure on the 
part of the governments.  
The decision to use the military for internal security can also be viewed as a 
practice from habit. Prior to the democratization of the states, the military authoritarian 
regimes used their military strength to repress the people whenever they protested or 
rioted for their rights. The military would fight back against the guerrilla insurgencies and 
“granted themselves authority to engage in widespread intervention.”171 It should come 
as no surprise that, despite attempts to minimize military roles post-military regime, the 
government’s natural response when faced with high levels of violence and insurgent-like 
behavior from crime organizations is to employ the military. According to José Miguel 
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Cruz during his talk with WOLA, this structural response from the government stems 
from over twenty years of containing threats with the use of force.172  
1. Military as Police: Benefit or Detriment? 
Despite all of the many reasons in which El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras 
turn to their militaries as a solution to the violence they are facing, the end result may or 
may not be the best in the long term. There seem to be many supporters of the new role of 
the militaries, as seen by the high number of citizens that want the military on the 
streets.173 However, on the other end of the spectrum, there are many critics that disagree 
with the use of the military. The following paragraphs will present both sides of the story 
in a fair manner. 
a. Benefits 
There are many benefits that can come from the use of the military as a police 
force in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Some of these benefits have already been 
touched on in previous paragraphs, but the following will cover each more specifically 
and offer some further benefits that have yet to be covered. All of the benefits are 
important to consider when determining whether the use of military force is worth the 
risks that are also associated with it. 
The first benefit to consider is the military’s capability to more evenly address the 
level of violence that is present in the region. As Pion-Berlin alludes to in his book, there 
are many differences in the capabilities of the police force and the military force, and 
given the level of crime and violence in the entire Latin American region, it is crucial to 
use the military.174 Given their capabilities, training, and armament, the military forces 
more evenly match the capabilities of the major crime organizations in the region and 
therefore increase the chances of success in thwarting the high levels of violence. 
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Without this benefit, there really may not even be a reason to send the police force alone 
because they would be outgunned and outnumbered.  
Another benefit that can be derived from the use of the military is that it answers 
the call from the citizens. This is an important aspect to consider, especially given the 
newer democratic regimes that are in place. The fact that the citizens are requesting the 
political leaders to use the military on the streets and it is actually happening is a win for 
democracy. This benefit satisfies the request of the people and also puts efforts in place to 
solve the problem at hand, which is a two-fold benefit, depending on which side of the 
coin one falls on.  
Connected to the benefit of satisfying the citizens, the use of the military can also 
help to minimize the creation of vigilante groups. As Cruz brings up in his talk with 
WOLA, the forming of civilian vigilante groups is a problem that is sometimes even 
promoted by the government themselves.175 Employing the military and satisfying the 
desires of the citizens can possibly reduce the citizen’s need or desire to take matters into 
their own hands. Vigilante groups only add to the violence, and the region does not need 
any more violence than it already has.  
Using the military for policing matters can also lead to greater support in an 
international context. As military forces focus their efforts on specific targets and have 
successful missions, there may be a significant drop in homicide rates, as seen in 
Honduras’ more focused approach on taking down known criminal networks.176 These 
success stories are viewed from outsiders in terms of the decline or increase in the 
number of homicides in the country. When the military is successful, the results are 
beneficial. 
The military can also serve to give citizens a greater sense of security in their 
everyday lives. Given the amount and level of violence that the everyday citizen in El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras can be exposed to, it is important for the political 
leaders to do anything they can to ensure the people are taken care of and feel safe. 
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Placing the military on the streets to be a presence and conduct patrols could provide 
citizens with a greater sense of security and safety. 
The last benefit to be discussed is the possible reaction the police force will have 
as a result of the military being used for internal security and policing. It is no secret that 
the resources—financial backing, personnel, training, pay, etc.—are limited in the region, 
and with such a strain on the resources, there is a possibility that the police will view the 
military as a barrier to those resources. This could lead to healthy competition between 
the two institutions for resources, which could ultimately lead to a better police and 
military. It could encourage the police to push through with reforms and to better serve 
the public. 
b. Detriments 
Just as there are many benefits that can come from the use of the military as a 
police, there are also many negative side effects that can be detrimental to society and the 
health of democracy. The following paragraphs will discuss a handful of these detriments 
in an attempt to provide a clear case for the opposition to the use of the military. These 
negative effects are vital for political leaders to discuss as they look to the future of 
policing in their countries. 
The first, and most discussed, detriment that can be taken away from the use of 
the military is the potential for an increase in human rights abuses. Human rights abuses 
run rampant through the entire Central America region and have always been an area of 
concern. The military’s job during the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala and prior 
to transitioning to a civilian-led government in Honduras was to repress the people and 
end the guerrilla insurgencies that were fighting against the authoritarian regime for the 
security of the state. In conducting their mission, “they repeatedly sacrificed individual 
rights and freedoms on behalf of the national security state.”177 Many view the use of the 
military, and the potential human rights abuses that are associated with it, as unnecessary 
because the situation does not improve in the long-term.178 As Pion-Berlin states it, to 
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use the military “would be to invite harm to citizens, whether intentional or 
unintentional.”179   
The military as police can also be viewed as a step in the wrong direction towards 
peaceful democratic control. As the civil wars ended and the transition to democracy 
began, the militaries in each country were supposed to lose political power and control, 
and reform to both minimize force size and reshape the leaders and missions. Removing 
the military from power was the first, and arguably the most important, step towards 
democracy.180 To give the military the power to interact with citizens and take control of 
policing efforts is a step in the wrong direction. 
Another impact of using the military is the line from military to police or police to 
military force is blurred and confused.181 As Pion-Berlin describes in his book, the job of 
a police officer and the job of a military officer are two very distinct jobs, with very 
specific training and tools that are used to carry out the specific missions they are 
assigned.182 Blurring these lines can result in the militarization of the police force, which 
is typically met with resistance as evident by the U.S. reaction to the police force used to 
control the riots in Ferguson, MO.183 
Another problematic result of the new role of the military is the potential for 
continuing, or increased, extrajudicial killings of criminals or people perceived to be 
criminals. This goes hand-in-hand with the human rights abuses but is of a nature so 
violent that it deserves its own attention separately than other human rights abuses. 
Military and police have been operating with impunity in the region and extrajudicial 
killings are the byproduct of that impunity. Given the training and operational style of 
military tactics, and the lack of fear of repercussions, the military may be a big 
contributor to the problem. 
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Accepting the military as the only solution to the violence also means that the 
country is accepting the failure of its institutions. It is best said by Jennifer N. Ross: 
“Bypassing civilian institutions and using the military in civic tasks sends exactly the 
wrong message—an acceptance of the ineffectiveness or even the failure of civilian 
institutions.”184 It is known that the weak institutions in Central America are part of the 
reason why the crime and violence are so high today, but using the military instead of 
pushing ahead on police reforms and cracking down on the corruption and lack of 
capability that the police have been facing is setting the wrong precedent for the future. If 
democracy is going to continue and thrive, the civilian institutions must overcome their 
difficulties and push ahead. Giving the military the responsibility is only demonstrating 
that the military should have more power and more political control—possibly reverting 
back to the days of the military authoritarian regimes.   
Previously mentioned as a benefit, the competition between military and police 
for limited resources can also turn into the demotivation for the police to continue their 
reforms and fight for resources. If the police perceive that they are no longer needed, 
there is a chance that they will relinquish all responsibility to the military and cease to 
function at all. The police must continue to function and reform their policies and ways of 
accomplishing the mission in order to not only fight the violence but maintain peace and 
trust with the citizens after the violence has ended. 
Clearly, based on the delta between the initial missions and plans for the use of 
the armed forces and the most recent examples of the actual missions the armed forces 
are conducting, the presence of criminal violence has led to the implementation of the use 
of the military to conduct internal policing-style missions. This is, however, only one part 
of the equation. The following chapter will provide more insight as to the nature of the 
civil–military relations. The current state of civil–military relations is important to 
determine whether or not the use of the military internally is a detriment to democracy or 
not, as well as the status of the police force as an institution designed to be the primary 
force for internal security. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The Northern Triangle states’ history of violence has left a negative legacy that 
continues to be filled today. This violence has left its mark on every institution within the 
states and continues to be one of the biggest problems within the region. In an attempt to 
counter the internal security threat that the high level of violence has become, the states 
are relying on the power and experience of their militaries to combat the high levels of 
crime and violence. How does the presence of criminal violence affect the role and 
missions of the military? Overall, the military is changed in three distinct ways. First and 
foremost, the missions and mindsets shift from one of traditional, counter-insurgency 
missions to one of internal, policing missions. As a result, the militaries change the 
primary equipment they use and procure in order to better complete their new tasks. 
Furthermore, the training and doctrine shifts as the focus shift from external missions to 
defend sovereignty to the new internal counter-crime missions. The use of the military is 




IV. CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF 
VIOLENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On June 28, 2009, the first military ousting of a democratically elected Latin 
American leader in over thirty years took place in Honduras. President Manuel Zelaya 
was forced from power by the military after having threatened their use to skew elections 
in his country.185 The significance of this event is that it highlights that instability in 
civil–military relations can still persist in Central American states, despite the 
consolidation of democracy. The precarious nature of civil–military relations is 
compounded by the increasing internal role that the militaries have begun to take in 
public security. This begs the question, with the Northern Triangle countries using their 
military forces to aid the police in an attempt to gain the upper hand on the violence, what 
has happened with the civil–military relations? What will the future of civil–military 
relations in the region look like? Will the high level of violence in the region, coupled 
with the military function play a role in the top civilian leaders changing their viewpoint 
of defense knowledge? Will this situation give civilians the incentive to become more 
knowledgeable? The first primary argument contends that Latin American civilian 
leaders do not have a reason to be knowledgeable in defense due to the lack of an 
external threat, and the second argues that civilian leaders must have defense knowledge, 
and must also be aware of what they do not know in order to maintain the control over 
the military. I argue that the criminal threat present in each country has undermined the 
civilian-controlled institutions and impulse of civilians to become knowledgeable about 
defense-related issues. The result is a civil–military imbalance, where the predominant 
anti-crime strategy is the military preferred mano dura policies. Should civilians gain 
expertise in public security and defense policy, alternative strategies could possibly come 
to the fore.  
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In order to address the question more fully, and to elaborate on this argument, this 
chapter unfolds as follows. First, I analyze the cases of El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras. Last, I offer analysis as a whole for the region based on the situations 
discovered in the cases of each country in the Northern Triangle. Specifically, this 
chapter will evaluate the civil–military relationship in each country at the start of the 
democratic era and then again during the current day to determine the change in civil–
military relations. The difference or evolution of the civil–military relationship in each 
country will then help to answer the question: How does the presence of criminal 
violence affect the civil–military relationship in each country? 
B. CASE ANALYSIS OF EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND HONDURAS 
As discussed in Chapter III, Central America has turned toward its police and 
military institutions to combat the high levels of violence they are facing. How does the 
employment of the military within the borders affect the status of civil–military relations 
in each country? The following case studies will look into each country in more detail, 
identifying the plans for increasing civilian control as civilian democracy took shape, and 
then studying the actual situation that is present in the Northern Triangle. The disparity 
between the two timeframes will help answer this question. 
1. El Salvador—Established Civil–Military Relations after Peace 
Agreement 
Similar to Chapter III, El Salvador was very careful when detailing the 
requirements for civilian control over the military and described the plan in detail in the 
1992 peace agreements. However, the peace agreements did not have a separate, full 
chapter dedicated to detailing the transition from military control over the political 
apparatus to civilian control. Instead, the agreements contained a single section, within 
chapter one, that defined the requirement for civilian control. According to this section, 
“the President of the Republic, in exercise of the power of discretion conferred on him by 
the Constitution, may appoint civilians to head the Ministry of Defence. In any case, 
appointees must be persons fully committed to observing the peace agreements.”186 
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Another important aspect of civil–military relations to take into account is the 
demobilization of the FMLN, while simultaneously creating the FMLN political party. 
Within the agreements, chapter six details that the former FMLN guerrilla fighters, after 
disarming and agreeing to the requirements set forth within the entire peace agreement, 
will have the full rights to participate in the civil and political functions of the country.187 
Furthermore, with the appropriate legislation, the FMLN would become a full political 
party, and be able to practice as such to include, “Freedom to canvass for new members; 
the right to set up an appropriate infrastructure (premises, printing works, etc.); free 
exercise of the right of assembly and mobilization for FMLN leaders, activists and 
members; freedom for FMLN to purchase and use advertising space in the mass 
media.”188  
Another area that was placed under the direction of civilian control is the 
intelligence services for the country. Specifically, the peace agreement stated that “the 
National Intelligence Department shall be abolished and State intelligence services shall 
be entrusted to a new entity to be called the State Intelligence Agency, which shall be 
subordinated to civilian authority and come under the direct authority of the President of 
the Republic.”189 The peace agreements emphasized the democratic use of intelligence 
services, with the oversight of the legislative branch and the constitution. 
In addition to the above components of the peace agreements, it is important to 
note that the requirements of the military set forth in chapter one of the agreement, 
outlined in the previous chapter, are all imperative to the civil–military relations within El 
Salvador. Specifically, the requirements to reduce the size of the military, require specific 
education, and define the military as an institution through constitutional reforms are key 
components to the transition to civilian control. Without these components, the military 
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would stand the chance to remain a major political influence in the country, despite the 
requirement for the Minister of Defense to be a civilian.   
2. Evolution of Civil–Military Relations to Modern-Day El Salvador 
Despite the requirements set forth in the peace agreements to aid El Salvador in a 
transition to civilian control, the country has struggled in following its own plan to have a 
civilian as the Minister of Defense. This problem started at the writing and language of 
the peace agreements. As noted above, the peace agreements state that the president 
“may” appoint civilians to head the Ministry of Defense or anyone that is committed to 
abiding by the requirements within the peace agreements. This opened the door from the 
start for the military to remain in control of the military by running the Ministry of 
Defense. According to the deputy chief of staff at the time, General Mauricio Vargas, the 
civilians did not possess the required knowledge and political background to successfully 
run the ministry.190 
When it comes to intelligence, the Salvadoran military is once again still heavily 
involved with intelligence gathering with a focus on internal security. Even after the 
peace agreement was implemented, the military intelligence apparatus kept operating, 
and arguably grew stronger after absorbing some of the former members that worked 
under the previous agency, the National Intelligence Department (DNI).191 While it is 
widely understood that a military has the need to gather and disseminate intelligence for 
external threats, the opposite—gathering intelligence internal to the country—can be 
viewed as a breakdown in democratic principles. With the high levels of criminal 
violence within the borders of the country, there exists a need to gather this type of 
intelligence, however, the intelligence apparatus for internal gathering should not be left 
to the military, but rather a civilian counterpart.   
Currently, the minister of defense in El Salvador is General David Munguia 
Payés. The selection of General Payés came under President Mauricio Funes in 2011, 
when he was selected for the position of Minister of Security and Justice, which was 
                                                 
190Williams and Walter, Militarization and Demilitarization, 169.  
191Ibid., 166.  
 59 
heavily criticized and ultimately ruled on in May 2013 by the Constitutional Chamber of 
the Supreme Court and deemed to be unconstitutional.192 After the ruling, General Payés 
was selected for the position of the Minister of Defense as of June 1, 2014.193 Even 
though there have been problems with selecting a civilian to head the Ministry of 
Defense, El Salvador has made many changes and has come a long way since the initial 
transition to democracy. El Salvador appears to be on the right track for now, with great 
strides being made in increasing the power civilians have, but still has a long way to go in 
order to completely transition the military to civilian control. 
3. Guatemala—Plans for Strengthening Civilian Authority after 1996 
Guatemala established a framework in the 1996 peace agreements that would 
ultimately strengthen the civilian control over the military. Similar to the peace 
agreement in El Salvador, Guatemala detailed the necessary changes in 1996 with the 
hope that it would allow for a strong civilian leadership and an apolitical military. As 
such, Guatemala recognized that in order to shift the balance in civil–military relations 
they needed to strengthen and reestablish the civil institutions.  
Within the “Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of 
the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society,” the Guatemalan government specifies 
changes that must be made to the constitution and society in order to accomplish their 
goal. The main areas of importance to highlight are the state and its system of 
government (Section I), the legislative branch (Section II), the executive branch (Section 
IV), and operational considerations resulting from the end of the armed conflict (Section 
VII).194 
Each of the sections plays an important role in the bigger picture of civilian 
control. Individually, they would not be successful in changing the relationship, but as a 
whole, they provided an excellent framework for Guatemala to carry forward as 
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democracy took root. In Section I, the agreement acknowledges the democratic nature in 
which the government will take shape moving forward, and notes that “Public authority, 
in the service of the common good, must be exercised by all the institutions of the State 
in such a way that no person, social sector, military force or political movement can 
usurp its exercise.”195 In Section II, the agreement highlights changes for the legislative 
branch. Specifically, the legislative branch must be a representation of the people, must 
function in the interest of the people, must be transparent with matters that concern the 
nation, and must discharge the duties towards the other branches of government in order 
to be strengthened.196 
Section IV of the agreement—the executive branch—contains six subsections, all 
of which contain crucial requirements for the strengthening of civilian control. Within the 
first subsection (the security agenda), the agreement identifies the needs to create an 
advisory council on security in order to “help the executive branch to implement [the] 
concept of integral security.”197 The council would encompass a broad representation of 
the people of Guatemala, selected by the president, and would serve to present 
recommendations and solutions to the president based on the major threats the country is 
faced with.198 Another component of the executive branch portion of the agreement to 
consider is the constitutional reform, which dictates that the president is in charge of the 
military, and that orders shall be issued “through the Minister of Defence, whether he is a 
civilian or a member of the military.”199 Lastly, the executive branch section lays out the 
specifics for the intelligence gathering components within the country. Specifically, it 
identifies the role of the Intelligence Department of the Office of the Chief of Staff for 
National Defense as being limited to the military, and announced the creation of the 
Civilian Intelligence and Information Analysis Department, which would operate under 
                                                 






the Ministry of the Interior and would serve to gather the intelligence needed to fight the 
internal security threat of crime.200 
The last important area to highlight from the agreement in terms of strengthening 
civilian control comes from Section VII—Operational considerations resulting from the 
end of the armed conflict. As discussed in the previous chapter, this section details the 
requirements for the reduction of both the size and budget of the country’s military 
forces, as well as the new requirements for the training of the military.201 All of which 
are vital requirements to minimize the political power that the military had during the 
civil war period from 1960–1996. 
4. Current Civil–Military Relations Status in Guatemala 
Despite having a good framework laid out initially for increasing civilian control, 
problems with weak institutions and military-political strength have continued to be the 
norm from 1996 until present time. The story of increasing civilian control and 
implementing the agreements within the peace accords seems to be a story of missed 
opportunities and disagreements, resulting in a country that cannot move forward with 
democratic institutions and practices. 
The problem with increasing the civilian control and power within the country 
started with implementing the 1996 agreements. In order to make the necessary 
constitutional changes and reforms, the Guatemalan constitution requires that congress 
has to have a two-thirds majority vote to approve the changes, followed by a majority 
vote involving all citizens.202 As the changes to the legislation were brought before 
congress, it took approximately two years for the vote to be reached to make the changes, 
but was followed-up with a dismal turnout on behalf of the citizens to vote the changes 
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in, with only 19 percent of the eligible voters in the country making it to the polls.203 In 
the end, the constitutional referendums were defeated due to low support and political 
will of the people. As such, the open-ended possibility from the peace agreements of 
having a civilian Minister of Defense faded as well because the Guatemalan Constitution 
requires the Minister of Defense to be a “general officer or colonel or his equivalent in 
the Navy.”204 
Looking back to the situation ten years after the peace agreement was established, 
Guatemala appeared to constantly be close to change, but not quite making it. Not only 
does the constitution require the Minister of Defense to be an active-duty officer, but the 
position started to gain “more power than the chief of the general staff of the armed 
forces.”205 The Ministry of Defense did make steps toward change by having a handful 
of civilians on the staff that had experience in the necessary areas of concern, such as 
defense policy; however, there is an annual change of personnel for each committee, 
which does not allow the knowledge to grow.206 Another area that was failing at the ten-
year point was the civilian intelligence role and oversight from the different branches of 
government toward the intelligence-gathering apparatus in the country.  
At the 15-year anniversary since the 1996 peace agreements, there was still 
minimal change, if any, towards the strengthening of the civilian control in the country. 
The high levels of criminal violence present in the country were causing the democratic 
institutions designed to swing the control in the favor of the civilians to be useless. Even 
more so because the military power was either still prevalent, or was embedded in the 
same criminal organizations that were undermining the civilian institutions, resulting in a 
perpetually weak state that seems legitimate to the people, but will never be able to 
overcome the violence and corruption.207 Also troubling for the future of the civil–
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military relations is the current state of affairs with President Jimmy Morales and the 
suspected involvement of his party—the National Convergence Front (FCN-Nation)—
with retired military officers that have been accused of human rights abuses.208 The 
situation advanced even further as 18 of the former military members with ties to the 
president were arrested on charges of human rights abuses during the 36-year long civil 
war, further weakening the civilian control in the country.209  
5. Honduras—Civilian Control Based on the 1982 Constitution 
As previously noted, unlike El Salvador and Guatemala, Honduras did not 
experience a civil war that led to the transition of power from military authoritarianism to 
civilian controlled democracy. Instead, the military initiated the transition in order to 
avoid a bloody civil war, and ultimately retain as much power as possible. This military 
initiated transition resulted in a still very powerful military retaining control and delaying 
the full transition to democracy for many years. Without the peace agreement that 
occurred in the other Northern Triangle countries, Honduras relied on a new constitution 
to make the necessary changes in their society. The result was an initial constitution that 
did not allow for the increase in civilian control. 
Per the constitution of 1982, Honduras did not create articles specifying that 
civilians would take control over the armed forces, but rather provided the military with 
more control and autonomy. According to article 277, the military was placed under 
control of the Commander-in-Chief, who was directed by the president.210 The 
constitution also specified that the Commander-in-Chief “must be a General or Superior 
Officer with the rank of Colonel of the Army or its equivalent, on active service, a 
Honduran by birth, and shall be elected by the National Congress from a list of three 
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proposed by the Superior Council of the Armed Forces.”211 Some changes began to take 
shape after the election of President Carlos Reina in 1993, as military power was 
decreased at the hands of the president and congress, resulting in the actual transition to 
civilian democracy in 1996.212   
6. Increasing Civilian Control in Honduras after 1999 
Civilian control took a turn for the positive during, and after the Reina presidency. 
His successor, President Carlos Flores, was elected in 1998 and made even more changes 
to turn the table in favor of civilian control. After the Hurricane Mitch tragedy struck 
Honduras, leaving 11,000 people dead, the military was activated to assist with the 
disaster relief effort. Instead of proving their ability and power, the military was unable to 
perform as they should have, ultimately undermining their position of authority and 
control in the eyes of Hondurans, and gave Flores the chance to make constitutional 
amendments, subjecting them to direct civilian control from the president.213 
Furthermore, in 1999, Flores fired the Honduran military’s commander and several other 
high-ranking officers in power, putting an end to the military’s intervention in the 
political sphere in Honduras for ten years.214 Within Flores’ amendments of 1999, the 
important changes took place in articles 277 through 280. Decree 245 of 1998 amended 
these articles and decree number two of 1999 ratified the amendments to remove the 
military Commander-in-Chief position within the military and replace the position of 
responsibility to the President of the Republic as the Commanding General of the 
military.215 The Secretary of State in the Office National Defense was established and 
detailed to be a civilian, who was selected by the president, with an active duty Chief of 
Staff.216 
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7. Honduras—Steps in the Wrong Direction 
After ten years of civilian control and movement towards a better balance of civil-
military relations, Honduras had a major backslide on June 28, 2009. As noted above, the 
Honduran military was involved in a coup d’état, ousting President Manuel Zelaya from 
office and extraditing him to Costa Rica. In the aftermath, the civilian control over the 
military vanished as the de facto government took control in the absence of a civilian 
president. 
The crisis began when President Manuel Zelaya attempted to hold a referendum 
to determine if the people of Honduras wanted to add a ballot item for a constituent 
assembly for the upcoming elections that were to be held in November of that year.217 
Despite the legislative and judicial branches—plus other political institutions—ruling the 
referendum unconstitutional, Zelaya continued to push forward, ultimately bringing the 
military back into the political realm, by ordering the military, as the Commanding 
General per the constitution, to participate in enforcing the referendum.218 The resulting 
de facto government enforced strict curfews, suppressed protests, and violated the rights 
of Hondurans until the November election took place, resulting in President Porfirio 
Lobo winning the election.219  
Since the 2009 coup, Honduras’ actions can best be characterized as 
militarization. Amid the chaos of the coup and the confusion that followed it, criminal 
organizations and street gangs took advantage of the situation and ultimately left the 
government with no choice but to turn to the military, as discussed in Chapter III. 
Honduras is currently in an unbalanced state of civilian control, with heavy reliance on 
the military and the police to enforce political requirements on the country as a result of 
the war on crime. 
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C. ANALYSIS  
The status of civil–military relations in all three countries is best described as 
unbalanced, with more power falling to the military than the civilians. The cases studied 
above show the difference between the plan at the initial transition to democracy to 
increase civilian control and the actual outcome of the transition that can be seen today. 
The question remains, how does the presence of criminal violence result in the civ-
military imbalance? The following analysis provides the answer in five parts. The first 
part of the answer starts with the transition from military authoritarianism to a 
consolidated democracy. The second part of the answer has to do with the criminal 
violence itself. The third piece of the answer is the civilian apparatus to control the 
military—the Ministry of Defense—coupled with the fourth piece—the civilian incentive 
to learn more. The final piece is the result that combines all of the other parts to the 
puzzle that have occurred over time. 
The transition to democracy established the framework for the increase in civilian 
control in each country. El Salvador and Guatemala generated a solid roadmap that, if 
followed, would result in a balanced civil–military relationship, with the civilians 
ultimately controlling the military. In Honduras, the framework was not as clear, but still, 
the constitution that was established presented the initial steps necessary to increase 
civilian control. From the onset of transitioning, all three countries appeared to be 
heading in the right direction—minimizing the political power of the military while 
simultaneously increase civilian control. 
The presence of violence in all three countries is not a new phenomenon that they 
are dealing with. As discussed in Chapter II, the region was established under violent 
conditions, which evolved over time. The civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala were a 
new form of violence, with military and police ultimately ruling society through the 
political elite. As all three countries transitioned, so did the violence. With so many 
displaced families as a result of the bloody civil wars, young children turned to gangs for 
a sense of family. In Honduras, the initial transition did little to nothing in terms of 
ending the impunity for death squads and military personnel. Rather, it allowed the 
increase in power and violence at the hands of the military, further driving the country 
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into violence. The rise in crime and violence occurred without delay, ultimately wreaking 
havoc on the transition plans established at the end of military rule. 
The Ministry of Defense, initially planned to be a civilian-centric institution 
designed to increase civilian control over the military, was a failure overall. Despite some 
success stories in each of the countries, the general trend continues that the military runs 
the organization. The reason for this is simple. As the crime, mentioned above, increased 
without delay, the civilians had little to no time to establish the proper civilian-controlled 
institutions necessary, or to become experts in defense related matters. The civilians 
needed to increase their defense knowledge and implement a Ministry of Defense that 
allowed them to grow in experience in order to maintain civilian control over the 
military, as Bruneau suggests.220 The best response at the time was to implement the 
military and their mano dura policies to combat the crime. Therefore, the presence of 
crime ultimately resulted in the military controlling the Ministry of Defense. 
Directly related to the Ministry of Defense shortfalls, is the lack of civilian 
incentive to learn defense, as Pion-Berlin suggests.221 As the military was utilized more 
and more in the countries, and they became further entrenched in the Ministry of 
Defense, the civilians began to lose any incentive they had for expanding their defense 
knowledge. There simply was no need to learn more. Furthermore, the civilians began to 
rely solely on the knowledge and experience of the military, instead of expanding their 
own. This further created problem in the civil–military relations, ultimately providing 
more political power and control back to the military. 
The result of the above chain reaction is an imbalanced civil–military relationship, 
where the military has grown in political might, civilian control has declined, and the 
military is relied on as the only solution. This may not be the worst-case scenario for 
civil–military relations, as the presidents in each country are still democratically elected 
civilians, but it is a step in the wrong direction. If the immediate presence of crime was 
not there, the story may have ended differently. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The two main arguments presented in the literature review present varying 
viewpoints as to the situation in Latin America. The first argument contends that civilian 
leaders in the region do not have a reason or incentive to increase their defense 
knowledge, and the second argument offers that the civilian leaders must possess some 
degree of knowledge, and insight into the knowledge they do not know in order to 
establish and maintain control of Latin American militaries. How has the presence of 
violence changed the civil–military relations in these countries? I argue that the 
foundation was laid in each country to increase the level of control civilian leaders had 
over their militaries, but the violence quickly derailed the plans. As the violence arose, 
the civilians did not have the necessary time to increase their knowledge or strengthen the 
civilian-controlled institutions—such as the Ministry of Defense—that were needed to 
implement the framework established after the transition to democracy. As a result, the 
military has monopolized the Ministry of Defense, further reducing the incentive for 
civilians to increase their knowledge. This has resulted in the civil–military imbalance 
that is present in each of the Northern Triangle states, where the anti-crime strategy has 




On November 15, 2016, the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras launched a new task force known as Fuerza Trinacional contra 
las Maras y Pandillas (Tri-National Force Against Maras and Gangs).222 The new unit 
consists of a combination of military personnel, police, and intelligence units from all 
three countries in an attempt to increase coordination and cooperation as gangs and other 
internal security threats commit crimes and flee across borders to evade law 
enforcement.223 This new task force highlights the importance of studying the effect that 
high rates of criminal violence have on countries’ militaries and civil–military relations. 
As violence continues to be a central theme for the Northern Triangle countries, they will 
continue to make changes in their militaries and civil–military relations in order to 
combat the rampant crime. 
This thesis argues that high levels of criminal violence and internal security 
threats play a major role in the implementation of the military and civil–military relations 
in all three of the countries studied. Specifically, the criminal violence has changed the 
military and the civil–military relations in each of the Northern Triangle countries. The 
military missions have changed from a focus on external defense and traditional counter-
insurgency missions to a focus on internal security threats. These new missions are being 
conducted in an attempt to thwart or minimize the high levels of violence that have been 
plaguing the region since the transitions from military authoritarianism to civilian 
democracy took place. Furthermore, the military’s equipment and future acquisition plans 
lend to a stronger ability to counter organized crime than they do defending sovereignty 
against outside threats. This change in focus on equipment that is better suited to combat 
drug traffickers and gangs has made a serious change in the militaries’ ability to conduct 
traditional military missions. Last, as a result of the changed missions and equipment, the 
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militaries’ training and doctrine has also shifted to an internal mission mindset, leaving 
very little room to focus on external aggressors. Naturally, as the missions have taken on 
new form, and the equipment procured to conduct these new missions has become the 
primary focus, the doctrine and training that follows has adapted to now focus more on 
policing and internal missions than on the ability to defend the national sovereignty of the 
state.   
Similarly, the civil–military relations in each country have been effected by the 
constant presence of criminal violence. This thesis argues that the immediate presence of 
violence after transitioning from military rule to civilian democracy left very little time 
and room for civilians to increase their knowledge on defense matters. As a result, the 
Ministry of Defense became a military-controlled institution instead of the civilian-
controlled institution it was hoped to be. This structural and organizational change in the 
Ministry of Defense ultimately relinquished civilian control over the military from 
civilians back to the military. This resulted in a politicized military and an imbalance in 
the civil–military relations in each country. Despite the framework for increased civilian 
control from the peace agreements and constitutions, the civilians have not been 
successful at implementing the required checks and balances to ensure the militaries 
remain apolitical.   
A. RESEARCH RELEVANCY  
The research and analysis contained in this thesis contribute to the federal 
government and our foreign policy, academics, and American citizens. Why is this 
research important for the military and U.S. government? The U.S. military has been and 
will likely continue to be involved in the region with training and operations. It is 
important for the military personnel traveling to these countries and this region to have a 
better understanding of the dilemma that the host nations are facing. This understanding 
will help the U.S. military and government to better position themselves for success in 
the region as they train and operate within the Northern Triangle. Understanding that the 
militaries in the countries are focused on counter-narcotics and counter-crime missions 
will help the way in which U.S. military forces train. Furthermore, this knowledge will 
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help tailor the U.S. military units that are required to train to those that are best suited for 
these missions, whether it be special forces, conventional troops, or a combination of 
both.    
How can this analysis be used to reshape foreign policy? The U.S. government 
needs to have a better grasp on the situation that the countries of the Northern Triangle 
are facing in order to better guide the policy makers on the best course(s) of action in 
terms of U.S. foreign policy towards the region. This research provides the insight needed 
in regards to the political and security matters that the Northern Triangle is facing. 
Specifically, the use of the military for internal security matters, and the departure from 
typical democratic civilian control over the military is a vital key to keep in mind when 
directing foreign policy to the Latin America region. With this research in mind, foreign 
policy decision makers may be inclined to redirect the foreign investment from the 
United States to specific Non-Governmental Agencies. In doing so, the U.S. foreign 
policy may be better equipped to handle the real problems within the countries—the 
socioeconomic issues that are likely to blame for the high crime rates—instead of sending 
money to further train and equip the military and their mano dura policies, ultimately 
resulting in more human rights abuses and a minimal effect, if any, on the crime rate. 
U.S. foreign policy to the region is not something that should be taken lightly, as the 
problems that are being faced in the Northern Triangle are geographically close to the 
United States. What affects Latin America can ultimately affect the United States, as the 
region is vital to U.S. national security. This research could also possibly assist foreign 
policy decisions in other areas of the world if the results of the study can be applied to 
different regions.  In this case, this research could be used as a way to create alternate 
policy options that might not have been readily apparent. 
Beyond the political utility, there is an intellectual one. Thus, it is relevant to 
academia and to society more broadly. The study of how the presence of constant 
criminal violence affects militaries and civil–military relations—or any other aspect of 
society—is a relatively understudied field. This research can be used as a springboard for 
further research into the field. As the field receives more attention, the chances of finding 
viable solutions to high levels of crime will increase, and actual solutions will become 
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more apparent. Furthermore, this area of study is important because it could possibly be 
applied to other areas of the world that academics are interested in studying as well. Why 
should American citizens be concerned about this research? Studying the situation in the 
Northern Triangle is important for everyday American citizens because Latin America is 
an important security partner with the United States. Given the geographic proximity, the 
debates on immigration, and the movement of illegal drugs through the Central American 
bridge states, all U.S. citizens are affected in one way or another by what is taking place 
in the region. Being educated on situations and problems that are occurring in Central 
America can benefit anyone that is interested in civil–military relations, military 
involvement in security affairs, and high levels of criminal violence. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The answers to the questions addressed in this research bring up questions about 
future U.S. foreign policy in the region. How should the U.S. address the situation in the 
Northern Triangle? How should the U.S. military adjust its support and training to the 
military forces in the Northern Triangle? The following recommendations are based on 
the research conducted for this thesis. 
Future U.S. policy towards El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras should be 
viewed through the lens of the crime and violence the countries are facing. Financial aid 
from the United States should be utilized in an attempt to address key areas that can be 
improved in order to fight the violence. Specifically, the foreign aid should be focused on 
improving infrastructure within the countries. Further improvements should be focused 
on education for school children, as well as the creation of afterschool and youth 
programs aimed at keeping kids out of the street gangs that are ruining the countries. 
Incentives could be provided to families that are able to keep their children in school and 
active within their communities. Police reform and anti-corruption programs—such as 
CICIG—should be a major focus, as the police need to take on a bigger role in fighting 
the countries internal security threats, and corruption negates the rule of law.  Reforming 
the police and increasing their level of responsibility for internal security will allow the 
militaries to transition back to traditional military roles of external security and border 
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defense. Furthermore, additional training and monitoring on human rights abuses should 
be a focus, as the military is continuing to patrol in the streets without the proper training 
in policing and use of force on civilians. Last, and most important, the foreign policy 
should attempt to promote the rule of law in the Northern Triangle in order to restore the 
judicial and legislative systems and to increase the trust that local citizens have in their 
own democratic governments. Focusing foreign policy and aid in these key areas would 
begin to address the real problem in the countries, and could possibly begin to diminish 
the violence. 
As time progresses, it is important to continue the research in both areas—
military missions and civil–military relations—to determine any further change in the 
status. The military missions may or may not begin to shift focus back to external defense 
if the crime rates begin to settle and diminish. Further research should also include the 
status of the police forces within each country to determine the impact, if any, they have 
on reducing the crime rates. Perhaps police reforms will eventually take hold and 
minimize the need for the military to assist in the internal security role within each 
country. Additional research is also needed in the civil–military relations realm in each 
country. Another possible answer to the question posed in this research could be that 
there is not an incentive problem, or even a problem as a result of the criminal violence at 
all. The answer may simply be that the civilians within the government do not care to 
participate in defense matters, and are satisfied with the military running the Ministry of 
Defense. Perhaps the outside influence from the United States and the UN forced the 
hand of each country to establish more civilian control over the military on paper in the 
peace agreements, without any real intent to implement the new controls. These areas of 
research will further help to identify the answers addressed in this thesis. 
This thesis aimed to provide insight into the affect of criminal violence on 
militaries and civil–military relations in the Northern Triangle.  The knowledge gained 
from this research should be built upon by academics with the goal of improving the 
information base and ultimately identifying theories that can be applied to the world at 
large.     
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